2
SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
Ante, at 2. But the Court today terminates the remedy
that proved to be best suited to block that discrimination.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) has worked to com
bat voting discrimination where other remedies had been
tried and failed. Particularly effective is the VRA’s re
quirement of federal preclearance for all changes to voting
laws in the regions of the country with the most aggravated
records of rank discrimination against minority voting
rights.
A century after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend
ments guaranteed citizens the right to vote free of dis
crimination on the basis of race, the “blight of racial
discrimination in voting” continued to “infec[t] the
electoral process in parts of our country.” South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). Early attempts to
cope with this vile infection resembled battling the Hydra.
Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified
and prohibited, others sprang up in its place. This Court
repeatedly encountered the remarkable “variety and
persistence” of laws disenfranchising minority citizens.
Id., at 311. To take just one example, the Court, in 1927,
held unconstitutional a Texas law barring black voters
from participating in primary elections, Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536, 541; in 1944, the Court struck down a
“reenacted” and slightly altered version of the same law,
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 658; and in 1953, the
Court once again confronted an attempt by Texas to “cir
cumven[t]” the Fifteenth Amendment by adopting yet
another variant of the all-white primary, Terry v. Adams,
345 U. S. 461, 469.
During this era, the Court recognized that discrimina
tion against minority voters was a quintessentially politi
cal problem requiring a political solution. As Justice
Holmes explained: If “the great mass of the white popula
tion intends to keep the blacks from voting,” “relief from
[that] great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the