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Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 31 GINSBURG, J., dissenting evils which have subsequently appeared.” 383 U. S., at 328–329 (emphasis added). Katzenbach, the Court acknowledges, “rejected the notion that the [equal sovereignty] principle operate[s] as a bar on differential treatment outside [the] context [of the admission of new States].” Ante, at 11 (citing 383 U. S., at 328–329) (emphasis omitted). But the Court clouds that once clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest Austin to convey that the principle of equal sovereignty “remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent dispar ate treatment of States.” Ante, at 11 (citing 557 U. S., at 203). See also ante, at 23 (relying on Northwest Austin’s “emphasis on [the] significance” of the equal-sovereignty principle). If the Court is suggesting that dictum in Northwest Austin silently overruled Katzenbach’s limita tion of the equal sovereignty doctrine to “the admission of new States,” the suggestion is untenable. Northwest Austin cited Katzenbach’s holding in the course of declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even what standard of review applied to the question. 557 U. S., at 203–204. In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the equal sovereignty principle in flat contra diction of Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis nonetheless coun sels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling on the limited “sig nificance” of the equal sovereignty principle. Today’s unprecedented extension of the equal sover eignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission of new States—is capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat States disparately are hardly novelties. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §3704 (no State may operate or permit a sports-related gambling scheme, unless that State con ducted such a scheme “at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990”);

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Shelby County v. Holder

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act — which determined which jurisdictions were subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5 — remained constitutionally valid after Congress reauthorized it in 2006 without updating the formula, given that the formula was based on decades-old data (voter registration and turnout from the 1960s and early 1970s) and practices (literacy tests) that had since been banned nationwide. More broadly, whether the formula violated the constitutional principle of equal sovereignty among the states by subjecting only certain jurisdictions to the extraordinary federal intrusion of preclearance.

Alleged Acts: Shelby County, Alabama, a jurisdiction covered by the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirements, filed a facial constitutional challenge against Section 5 and Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 required covered jurisdictions to obtain federal approval (preclearance) from either the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel of the D.C. District Court before implementing any change in voting procedures. Section 4(b) contained the coverage formula that determined which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5—based on whether the jurisdiction had used a "test or device" to restrict voting (such as a literacy test) and had voter registration or turnout below 50% in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 2006, Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act for another 25 years, maintaining both the preclearance requirement (Section 5) and the original coverage formula (Section 4(b)) without updating the formula to reflect current conditions. Shelby County argued that the coverage formula was unconstitutional because it relied on decades-old data and eradicated practices, violating the principles of federalism and equal sovereignty among the states.

Procedural history: The district court denied Shelby County's motion for discovery, holding that a facial challenge to the VRA's 2006 reauthorization must be evaluated solely on the legislative record compiled by Congress. After briefing, the three-judge district court panel upheld both Section 5 and Section 4(b), finding that the extensive legislative record compiled by Congress demonstrated "current needs" justifying the 2006 reauthorization. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court, applying the two-part test from Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (2009): (1) whether Section 5's current burdens are justified by current needs, and (2) whether the disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently supported. The court found both prongs satisfied.

Summary: Shelby County v. Holder is one of the most consequential voting rights decisions in modern American history. The Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula (Section 4(b)) of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional because it relied on data and practices from the 1960s and 1970s that no longer reflected current conditions. While the Court did not formally invalidate Section 5's preclearance requirement, by striking down the formula that determined which jurisdictions were covered, it effectively rendered preclearance inoperable. The decision was grounded in the principles of federalism and equal sovereignty, with the Court holding that the extraordinary federal intrusion into state electoral processes was no longer justified by current conditions. The ruling dramatically changed the landscape of voting rights enforcement in the United States, as previously covered jurisdictions were immediately freed from preclearance obligations and could implement voting changes without prior federal approval. The decision left it to Congress to enact a new coverage formula based on contemporary data, but as of 2026, Congress has not done so. The case has been cited as a critical precedent in subsequent voting rights litigation, including Brnovich v. DNC (2021) and Allen v. Milligan (2023).

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and held that Section 4(b)'s coverage formula was unconstitutional. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Court held that Section 4(b)'s coverage formula was unconstitutional because it relied on decades-old data and eradicated practices that no longer reflected current conditions. The Court reaffirmed the principle of equal sovereignty — that states must be treated equally by the federal government — and held that the coverage formula's extraordinary departure from the traditional federal-state balance was no longer justified. Applying the Northwest Austin standard, the Court held that regardless of the VRA's past success, "past success alone... is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance requirements." The Act imposes current burdens that must be justified by current needs, and the stale coverage formula failed this test.

Legal Issue(s)

Elections as a Fundamental Right
Electoral Administration Irregularities
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965, Tenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and Article IV of the United States Constitution.

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 25, 2013

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.8906

Longitude: -77.0047

: Geolocation

Link: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12-96/case.pdf

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Shelby County v. Holder.pdf
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Shelby County v. Holder

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