TĂNASE v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT 31 ensuring the loyalty of MPs to the Moldovan State. However, it considered that the means employed by the Government for the purpose of ensuring the loyalty of its MPs to the State were disproportionate. There was therefore a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 135. In its assessment of the proportionality of the measure, the Chamber took into consideration the practice of other member States of the Council of Europe and other methods available to the Government to ensure the loyalty of MPs, such as requiring them to swear an oath. It also considered the provisions of the ECN and the comments of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (the Venice Commission) on the new Law. Even in the specific context of Moldova’s political evolution, the Chamber was not satisfied that the prohibition on multiple nationals sitting as MPs could be justified, particularly in view of the fact that such a far-reaching restriction had been introduced approximately a year or less before the general elections. B. The parties’ submissions 1. The Moldovan Government 136. The Government explained by way of preliminary remarks that all that was required under Law no. 273 was that an individual prove that he had initiated a procedure to renounce the citizenship of any other State (see paragraph 79 above). Further, as noted above (see paragraph 98), once the Constitutional Court had confirmed the mandate of an MP, there was no mechanism whereby the mandate could subsequently be revoked: the Law made no provision for such a procedure. 137. The Government reiterated its submissions before the Chamber that the interference was lawful and that it pursued the legitimate aims of ensuring loyalty, defending the independence and existence of the State and guaranteeing the security of the State. They pointed to the findings of the Constitutional Court as to the consistency of Law no. 273 with the Moldovan Constitution and international conventions (see paragraph 55 above). They contested the Chamber’s conclusion that the measure was not proportionate, arguing that the Chamber had failed to give adequate weight to their submissions on the special historical context of Moldova which in their view necessitated restrictions on those with dual nationality becoming MPs. They pointed out that when the ECN was ratified in 1999, the number of Moldovans holding dual nationality was insignificant as it was not permitted under the law in force at the time (see paragraph 22 above). Accordingly, no reservation in respect of Article 17 was thought necessary. They further explained that in 1999, Moldova was not a parliamentary republic as it is today, but a semi-presidential republic. The legislature