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debe ser “suficientemente clara e inteligible”.153 Por su parte, precisa que la capacidad se entiende desde dos acepciones: (i) como “la aptitud que tienen todas las personas o sujetos de derecho para ser titulares de derechos y obligaciones”;154 y (ii) “el poder que se les reconoce a la mayoría, ya que no a todos los sujetos de derecho, para actuar directamente, por sí mismos, en el comercio jurídico, vale decir, para realizar actos jurídicos”.155 Con base en lo anterior, Ospina Fernández concluye que “(…) toda persona necesariamente tiene capacidad para adquirir derechos y contraer obligaciones, pero algunas no la tienen para intervenir por sí mismas en el comercio jurídico”.156 En esta misma línea, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido que “la capacidad jurídica, o sea, la capacidad para ser titular de derechos subjetivos patrimoniales, la tiene toda persona sin necesidad de estar dotada de voluntad reflexiva; en cambio, la capacidad de obrar está supeditada a la existencia de esa voluntad”.157 Sin embargo, la Corte también ha diferenciado la capacidad legal de una persona de su autonomía para decidir ciertos asuntos, tales como los procedimientos médicos, por ejemplo. En palabras de la Corte: “68. En concordancia con las anteriores reglas, la jurisprudencia constitucional ha indicado que la autonomía necesaria para tomar una decisión sobre procedimiento o intervenciones en la salud no es una noción idéntica a la capacidad legal propia del derecho civil o aquella necesaria para ejercer el voto. En efecto, se distingue entre estos dos conceptos de capacidad dado que “una persona puede no ser legalmente capaz, pero sin embargo ser suficientemente autónoma para tomar una opción médica en relación con su salud” o viceversa. 153 Ospina Fernández, Guillermo y Ospina Acosta, Eduardo. “Teoría general del contrato y del negocio jurídico”. Ed. Temis (2019). Pág. 29. 154 Ospina Fernández, Guillermo y Ospina Acosta, Eduardo. “Teoría general del contrato y del negocio jurídico”. Ed. Temis (2019). Pág. 21. 155 Ospina Fernández, Guillermo y Ospina Acosta, Eduardo. “Teoría general del contrato y del negocio jurídico”. Ed. Temis (2019). Pág. 21. 156 Ospina Fernández, Guillermo y Ospina Acosta, Eduardo. “Teoría general del contrato y del negocio jurídico”. Ed. Temis (2019). Pág. 21. 157 Corte Constitucional, sentencia C-182 de 2016 (MP Gloria Stella Ortiz Delgado; AV María Victoria Calle Correa; SV Luis Guillermo Guerrero Pérez; SPV Gabriel Eduardo Mendoza Martelo; SV Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva). 97

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Sentencia C-025/21

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether Article 6 of Law 1996 of 2019, which establishes the presumption of full legal capacity for all persons with disabilities regardless of whether they use supports, is constitutional; whether Article 53 of Law 1996 of 2019, which repealed all provisions related to interdiction and inhabilitation in the Colombian legal system, is constitutional; and whether the shift from a substitute decision-making model (guardianship/interdiction) to a supported decision-making model is consistent with the Colombian Constitution and Colombia's international obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), ratified by Colombia via Act 1346 of 2009.

Alleged Acts: Law 1996 of 2019 was enacted to reform Colombia's legal capacity regime for persons with disabilities. The law eliminated the civil law mechanisms of "interdiction" (interdicción) and "inhabilitation" (inhabilitación) — forms of guardianship that historically stripped persons with disabilities of their legal capacity, including the right to vote, enter contracts, exercise parental authority, and participate in public life. Under the old regime, a judicial declaration of interdiction resulted in the automatic loss of legal capacity and civil rights, including political rights. Law 1996 of 2019 replaced this substitute decision-making model with a supported decision-making framework, establishing a legal presumption of full capacity for all persons with disabilities and creating mechanisms for "support agreements" (acuerdos de apoyos) and judicial adjudication of supports (adjudicación judicial de apoyos). Several citizens filed constitutional challenges (demandas de inconstitucionalidad) against various articles of Law 1996 of 2019, arguing that the elimination of interdiction and the presumption of full legal capacity for persons with disabilities was unconstitutional. The challengers contended that removing the traditional guardianship framework left vulnerable individuals without adequate protection and that the presumption of capacity could expose persons with disabilities to exploitation or harm.

Procedural history: The constitutional challenges were filed with the Colombian Constitutional Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over abstract constitutional review of legislation. A companion decision, Sentencia C-022/21 (February 4, 2021), addressed a preliminary procedural challenge regarding whether Law 1996 of 2019 should have been enacted as a statutory law (ley estatutaria) requiring special procedural requirements, rather than an ordinary law. The Constitutional Court resolved that procedural issue, allowing the substantive review to proceed in Sentencia C-025/21.

Summary: Sentencia C-025/21 is a landmark Colombian Constitutional Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of Law 1996 of 2019, which abolished the centuries-old interdiction (guardianship) regime and replaced it with a modern supported decision-making framework. The Court ruled that the presumption of full legal capacity for all persons with disabilities is constitutional, that the prior interdiction system violated human rights — including the right to vote — and that even persons with severe intellectual disabilities must be provided with all reasonable accommodations to express their will and preferences. This ruling aligns Colombian law with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and represents one of the most significant constitutional reforms in Latin America regarding the legal capacity and political rights of persons with disabilities. The decision is particularly significant for disability voting rights because it eliminates the legal framework that automatically disenfranchised persons under guardianship and establishes an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide accommodations to facilitate political participation.

Conclusion: The Constitutional Court declared Articles 6 and 53 of Law 1996 of 2019 constitutional (exequible). The Court inhibited itself from ruling on certain other challenged articles but addressed the core provisions. The Court held that Article 6, establishing the presumption of full legal capacity for all persons with disabilities, is consistent with the Constitution's principles and with the provisions of Act 1346 of 2009 (CRPD). The Court affirmed that persons with disabilities are subjects of rights with full legal capacity on equal terms with others. The Court concluded that the prior interdiction regime violated the human rights of persons with disabilities. The denial of legal capacity prevented persons with disabilities from accessing other fundamental rights, including the right to vote, parental authority, and contractual autonomy. As stated in the Court's reasoning: "La negación de la capacidad jurídica de las personas con discapacidad les impide acceder a otros derechos, como el voto, la patria potestad..." (The denial of legal capacity prevents persons with disabilities from accessing other rights, such as voting, parental authority...). The Court declared Article 53 constitutional, affirming that the repeal of all interdiction and inhabilitation mechanisms was a necessary step to comply with Colombia's constitutional and international human rights obligations. The law expressly ordered the repeal of all mechanisms that substitute the legal capacity of persons with disabilities. The Court established that the presumption of legal capacity has a material effect requiring accommodations. As stated: "El efecto de la presunción del ejercicio de la capacidad legal se materializa en que, aún en un caso en el que la persona tiene una discapacidad intelectual y que se encuentra imposibilitada para manifestar su voluntad, debe garantizarse por todos los medios y los ajustes razonables que requiera, la manifestación de su voluntad y preferencias." (The effect of the presumption of the exercise of legal capacity materializes in that, even in a case where the person has an intellectual disability and is unable to manifest their will, their will and preferences must be guaranteed through all means and reasonable adjustments required.). The Court concluded that the recognition of legal capacity for adult persons with disabilities, provided they are given appropriate support and information, is in accordance with the Constitution's principles and with the provisions of Act 1346 of 2009 (approval of the CRPD). The law aligns Colombian jurisprudence with Article 12 of the CRPD, which requires states to recognize persons with disabilities as persons before the law with equal legal capacity in all aspects of life.

Legal Issue(s)

Accessibility
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Law 1996 of 2019, Colombia Constitution, Act 1346 of 2019, and the Convention on the Right of Disabled Persons

Region: Americas

Country: Colombia

Language of Decision

Spanish

Court: Constitutional Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Feb 4, 2021

Geolocation

Latitude: 4.599

Longitude: -74.0755

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2021/c-025-21.htm

Primary Documents

C-025-21.pdf
Spanish
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