compliance with the law. We shall revert to the issue of the shifting of the burden of proof later in this judgment. (ii) Standard of Proof [134] The standard of proof is the one which raised controversy in this petition. On the applicable standard of proof, the petitioners submitted that this Court erred in the 2013 Raila Odinga case in holding that save where criminal allegations are made in a petition, the standard of proof in election cases is the intermediate one: above a balance of probabilities but below the one for criminal cases of beyond reasonable doubt. [135] Appreciating that the Court had reviewed several positions held by various jurisdictions in setting the standard of proof in the 2013 Raila Odinga case, the petitioners submitted that the emerging jurisprudence set out by the House of Lords in England is that in law, there exists only two standards of proof, the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt and the civil standard of balance of probabilities. They cited the case of Re B (Children)55 in support of that proposition. [136] It was further urged that besides Canada, the position held by the House of Lords has recently been emulated by the Constitutional Court of Seychelles in Wavel John Charles Ramkalawan v. The Electoral Commission56. [137] Citing the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of FH v. Ian Hugh McDougall57, the petitioners contended that the elevation Re B (Children) (2008) UKHL 35. Wavel John Charles Ramkalawan v. The Electoral Commission (2016) SCCC 11. 57 FH v. McDougall (2008) 3 SCR 41. 55 56 Presidential  Petition  No.  1  of  2017                                                                                                                                                                                                            55  |  P a g e