Congress which was held on December 8, during which the required votes were obtained to censure the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal in an impeachment proceeding. As a second item on the agenda, the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice were also terminated, unduly applying the twenty-fifth transitory provision of the 1998 Constitution, according to which officials and members of bodies appointed by the National Congress for a four-year period, as of August 10, 1998, would remain in office until January 2003. These decisions would subsequently be reversed by the National Congress, but this did not entail the reinstatement of the members who had been removed. 24. It is important to stress that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers at that time, Leandro Despouy, participated in the settlement of this political and social crisis by recommending different solutions and an evaluation of their implementation. At that time, he indicated that, in the case of the removal of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, the right of defense and other principles of due process had been infringed.27 Regarding the removal of the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, he indicated that the National Congress was not empowered to do this, and neither was it authorized to appoint substitutes.28 25. The importance of taking into account the context is that this is a determinant factor when deciding the institutional structure to be implemented in a specific place in order to isolate judges from undue influences. 29 The factors that can have an impact on the effective exercise of judicial independence include: (a) the existence of an authoritarian regime; (b) the existence of cultural patterns that may minimize the usefulness of the jurisdiction as a mechanism to settle disputes; (c) the commitment of civil society to judicial independence, and policies that promote this, and (d) the legal tradition, either continental European or common law.30 In point of fact, in the case of Latin American in general, it has been said that democracy continues to be weak and strong Executives Branches have been a constant source of attacks on judicial independence.31 26. In this specific case, among the proven facts, the ICourtHR considered that, at times during Ecuador’s history, “the high courts were intervened by the political authorities,” and that according to “expert witness Mónica Rodríguez, proposed by the State, `in Ecuador, the independence of the Supreme Court of Justice has been compromised and the institution exploited throughout its history.´”32 IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE CASE LAW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELATION TO THE REMOVAL OF JUDGES U.N. document E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4 of 29 March 2005, p. 3. See also U.N. documents A/60/321 of 31 August 2005 and A/HCR/11/41 of 24 March 2009. 27 28 Ibidem. MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, op. cit., p. 846. Similarly, Linares considers that the study of independence in a country requires a qualitative knowledge of the political agents and relevant issues on which power is exercised. Linares, Sebastián, “Independencia judicial: conceptualización y medición”, in Germán Burgos S. (ed.), Independencia Judicial en América Latina. ¿De quién? ¿Para qué? ¿Cómo?, ILSA, Bogotá, 1ª ed., 2003, pp. 121 and 122. 29 30 MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, Ibidem. Horan, Jennifer E. and Meinhold, Stephen S., “Separation of powers and the Ecuadorian Supreme Court: exploring presidential-judicial conflict in a post-transition democracy”, The Social Science Journal, 2012, vol. 29, pp. 232-234. 31 32 Para. 41 of the Judgment. 7