57. Regarding the case law of the ICourtHR — as can be seen in the preceding section – this has developed both the independence of the Judiciary as an expression of the principle of the separation of powers in a democratic system, and also the independence of the judges as a right they possess in the exercise of their functions, and even as a right of the citizen of access to justice and to judicial guarantees. 58. Thus, as indicated in the preceding section, the ICourtHR has established that one of the main purposes of the separation of the powers is to guarantee the independence of judges.75 The State must ensure the autonomous exercise of both the institutional aspect, that is with regard to the Judiciary as a system, and also in relation to its individual aspect; that is, in relation to the person of the specific judge. The objective of the protection is to avoid the judicial system, in general, and its members, in particular, being subjected to possible undue constraints in the exercise of their function by organs outside the Judiciary or even by those judges who exercise functions relating to review or appeal. 76 The purpose of the principle of the separation of powers is satisfied in two ways, which correspond to these two aspects: the institutional and the individual. When the State is obliged to protect the Judiciary as a system, it guarantees its external independence. When it is obliged to provide protection to the person of the specific judge, it guarantees its internal independence. 59. The ICourtHR has also maintained that, since Article 8(1) of the Convention recognizes that “[e]very person has a right to a hearing […] by an independent […] judge or court,” the terms in which this article was drafted indicate that the subject of law is the defendant, the person placed in front of the judge who will decide the case that has been submitted to him.77 The two obligations referred to when examining the case law of the ICourtHR arise from this right: the first that of the judge, and the second that of the State.78 60. Now, the ICourtHR has also determined that, in turn, the said obligations of the State give rise to rights for judges or for other citizens. For example, the guarantee of an adequate procedure for the appointment of judges necessarily entails the right of the citizen to accede to public office in equal conditions; the guarantee not to be subject to removal at will results in the disciplinary and sanctioning proceedings for judges necessarily respecting the guarantees of due process of law, and those prejudiced being offered an effective remedy; the guarantee of tenure should result in an adequate employment regime for the judge in which, inter alia, transfers, promotions and other conditions are sufficiently controlled and respected.79 61. The ICourtHR, in this specific case, found that “the objective dimension is related to essential aspects of the rule of law, such as the principle of the separation of powers, and the important role played by the judicial function in a democracy. Consequently, this objective dimension transcends the figure of the judge and has a collective impact on society. In addition, a direct relationship exists between the objective dimension of judicial Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 73. 75 Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182. para. 55. 76 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 148. 77 78 Ibidem, para. 146. 79 Ibidem, para. 147. 14