independence and the right of judges to accede to and remain in office under general terms of equality, as an expression of their guarantee of stability.” 80 Therefore, “when the permanence of judges in office is arbitrarily affected, the right to judicial independence established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention is violated, in conjunction with the right of access to and permanence in public service, under general conditions of equality, established in Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention.” 81 On this point, it is relevant to emphasize that this interactive interpretation of Articles 8(1) and 23(1)(c) of the American Convention allows the ICourtHR to complement its case law in the case of Reverón Trujillo by clarifying that the institutional guarantee of judicial independence derived from Article 8(1) of the American Convention, results in a subjective right of the judge that his permanence in public office is not affected arbitrarily, under Article 23(1)(c) of the Pact of San José. VI. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THIS CASE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH DEMOCRACY 62. In this case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argued that it was difficult for the National Congress to be able to guarantee independence, since, by nature, it was a political body and, in particular, since it responded to interests of the Government and of parliamentary majorities, with the result that Congress did not guarantee the right to an independent judge, in its individual aspect, nor acted as such. In addition, the Commission argued that, with regard to the impeachment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the expression “constitutional or statutory offenses,” and the formulation of grounds for removal did not provide clear, certain and sufficiently determined standards to safeguard the principle of judicial independence. In addition, the Commission and the victims’ representatives noted that the call to impeachment on December 1, 2004, was made after the statutory time frame had expired. Also the victims were summoned to it with only six days’ notice and, in the case of the second vote on the impeachment proceeding of December 8, 2004, the victims were not notified, and did not have the possibility of taking part in the proceeding or exercising their right of defense. 63. In this regard, the Judgment expressly examined the institutional aspect of judicial independence, in order to determine to what extent the collective termination of the judges of the three high courts of Ecuador constituted “an attack not only on judicial independence but also against the democratic order.”82 The ICourtHR reached the conclusion that the members of the Constitutional Tribunal were removed by a resolution of the National Congress, even though it was not empowered to do this, without any legal grounds, and without being heard. It also verified irregularities in the impeachment proceedings, which, in addition, were based on jurisdictional decisions adopted by the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, which was even prohibited by domestic law. 64. The resolution by which it was agreed to terminate the members of the Constitutional Tribunal was the result of a political alliance aimed at creating a judicial apparatus that was favorable to the political majority of the time, as well as to prevent the criminal proceedings against the President in office and a former President. Thus, the resolution of Congress was not adopted based exclusively on the assessment of specific 80 Para. 198 of the Judgment. 81 Para. 199 of the Judgment. 82 Para. 207 of the Judgment. 15