freedom. Norms that fail to strictly delimit criminal conducts violate the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention.157 2. In this case 118. Some factual clarifications must be made in order to understand the possible application of the principle of legality in this case. In this regard, it should be stressed that the termination of the judges on November 25, 2004, and the impeachment proceedings that were held subsequently, were not of a criminal nature. However, and as indicated previously, there is no dispute about the punitive nature of impeachment, so that there is no discussion about the possible analysis of these facts in light of Article 9 of the American Convention, because, according to the case law of the ICourtHR, the principle of legality functions not only in criminal matters, as established in the preceding section. 119. Indeed, according to article 130(9) of the 1998 Constitution, the effect of the adoption of the motion of censure was the immediate removal of the official. 158 In this regard, in the session of December 8, 2004, when the vote was held on the motions of censure, it was concluded that “the motion of censure presented ha[d] been adopted.” 159 Thus, since two of the motions of censure presented against the judges in the session of December 8, 2004, had been adopted, this entailed their removal, a sanction that added to the termination decision taken previously on November 25, by the resolution of the National Congress. Also, based on what was indicated previously (supra paras. 115 and 116), I must conclude that, owing to its scope, article 130(9) of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution could lead to abusive interpretations by the National Congress, as indeed occurred in this case, because this paragraph contained an extremely general and imprecise definition of the grounds for removal (“The other officials referred to in this paragraph may be impeached for constitutional or statutory offenses, committed in the performance of their functions”). In my opinion, this is clearly incompatible with the legal certainty that the principle of legality of Article 9 of the Convention seeks to ensure in the case of situations resulting from an abuse of power (see below paras. 120 to 137). C) Regarding the concept and scope of the “abuse of power” 120. Analysis of the concept of “abuse of power” — particularly in Spanish legal doctrine – is based on the legal definition: “the exercise of administrative powers for purposes other than those established by law shall constitute abuse of power.” 160 Thus, even though they support this concept, García de Enterría and Fernández state that it is not exhaustive, because, in their opinion, it is not necessary that the purpose sought is only specific to the administrative agent. They affirm that “it is sufficient that this purpose, even though public, should be other than the one conceived and established by the norm that grants the Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177, para. 63. Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 121, and Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 125. The Court has also stressed that laws that establish restrictions “must use precise criteria and not grant unfettered discretionality to those responsible for their enforcement.” Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 124. 157 158 Paras. 73, 171 and 201 of the Judgment. 159 National Congress, record 24-001-IV, session of December 8, 2004 (merits file, tome II, folio 649 and 659). García Enterría, Eduardo and Ramón Fernández, Tomás, Curso de derecho administrativo I, Editorial CIVITAS, Madrid, 1981, third edition, chapter VIII, section IV.1.B, p. 394. 160 33