power.”161 They state that, “consequently, what is at stake is the administrative legality and not the morality of the official or of the Administration itself. This is precisely why the abuse of power is not limited to the presumptions in which the real purpose sought is an objective specific to the agent, but extends, as stated, to all the cases in which, abstraction made of the conduct of the agent, it is possible to note the existence of a divergence between the purposes really sought and those that, according to the applicable norm, should guide the administrative decision.”162 121. Continuing to develop this position, García de Enterría and Fernández point out the probative problems of their analysis. Indeed, they indicate that “…the main difficulty entailed by the use of the technique of the abuse of power is proving the divergence of purposes that constitutes its essence. It can easily be understood that this evidence may not be complete, because it is not easy to presume that the illegal act expressly acknowledges that its purpose is other than the one indicated in the norm.”163 122. Furthermore, regarding the origin of the expression, it has been indicated that: “VI. Origin of the expression The expression détournement de pouvoir (abuse of power) was first used by León Aucoc to refer to the policing powers of an administrative agent, who used these powers for reasons other than those established by positive law. Subsequently, Laferrière systematized and developed the expression to the level at which we know it today. Thus, he defined détournement de pouvoir as the irregularity consisting in diverting a legal power from the purpose for which it was established and using it for purposes for which it was not designed.” […] “Abuse of power is an offense committed by a public official or agent by issuing an administrative decision with a subjective motive that impairs the purpose of general interest that the legislator had in mind when granting the power. […] In the abuse of power, the administrative decision has a purpose that is contrary to the general interest, because the agent who issues the decision is guided by subjective or internal motives. While in the case of unreasonableness and arbitrariness, the official may act in pursuit of the purpose of the law, but the means he uses are disproportionate.” 164 123. Similarly, it has been maintained that: “Theoretically, the principle of the abuse of power is applicable in three cases, in all of which the officials acts with a different objective to the one sought by the law he or she executes: a) The official acts with a personal objective: under this hypothesis, his actions are guided by revenge, partisanship, profit, etc. In these cases, even though the act responds objectively to the conditions expressly required by the law, it is illegal because it contravenes the purpose of the law; b) The official acts in order to benefit one or several third parties: this happens, also without objectively violating the law, when the official uses administrative powers in order to benefit third parties; for example, if an official is authorized to enter into direct contracts without public competitions and he contracts a certain company because it belongs to his friends and he wants to help them win the contract, etc. c) The official acts in order to benefit the administration: this is a fairly common case, and probably the one in which there is most abuse of power. The official, imbued with an erroneous statist and 161 Ibidem, p. 394. 162 Ibidem, p. 394. 163 Ibidem, p. 395. Barraza, Javier Indalecio, “La finalidad del acto administrativo y la desviación de poder”, Revista Ius Publicum, Universidad Santo Tomás, v. 14, No. 29, 2012, pp. 51-52. 164 34