fiscalist spirit, as the Argentine official usually is owing to the pressure of misguided doctrinaires, seeks to exercise the power of the law to the undue benefit of the administration or of the State. Thus, he tries to collect the most fines, not to discourage non-compliance with municipal ordinances, but to obtain funds for the municipality; he uses the powers granted to him by the state of emergency (internal security) for ordinary purposes of controlling morality, etc.”165 124. For their part, authors such as Atienza and Ruiz Manero explain abuse of power as “… a species within the genus of “exces de pouvoir,” inasmuch as it is a category created to subject discretional administrative acts to judicial control.” 166 According to these authors, “the abuse of power signifies the use of power exceeding the limits established in the corresponding norm that grants the power.” 167 In this regard, the authors present abuse as an alteration between the purpose or consequence of the norm and the result, but on the basis that, in the public sphere, there is no autonomy of action, finding the limit in the exercise of the public function at the service of general interest. 168 In addition, they understand that, in order to assess whether we are in the presence of an abuse of power, it is necessary to recall the legal principles that have led to the establishment of the reasons for the law.169 Atienza and Ruiz Manero consider that their definition differs from those usually made by legal doctrine, because it goes beyond legal positivism, “…the reference to the law is substituted by the legal principles that justify and that the implementation of the law that confers the corresponding power; namely, the principles that regulate how the result is obtained.”170 125. It should be emphasized that these authors indicate that the abuse of power does not refer only to administrative powers, but that it can also occur in jurisdictional and legislative spheres. Indeed, both judges and legislators have guidelines with objectives established within the framework of different principles from which they may stray, incurring in an abuse of power.171 D) “Abuse of power” in the case law of the Inter-American Court Gordillo, Agustín, Tratado de derecho administrativo y obras selectas, tome 5, primeras obras, 1st edition, Buenos Aires, FDA, 2012, p. EAA-IV-18; ibíd., El acto administrativo, 1ª edición, Buenos Aires, AbeledoPerrot, 1963, reprinted as Libro II of the Tratado de derecho administrativo y obras selectas, cit., available at: http://www.gordillo.com/tome5.html and http://www.gordillo.com/pdf_tome5/02/02-capitulo4.pdf 165 Atienza, Manuel and Ruiz Manero, Juan, “Ilícitos atípicos”, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2000, chapter IV, section 27, p. 92. 166 167 Ibidem. 168 Ibidem. Atienza and Ruiz Manero, after providing this explanation, make the following analysis: “Action ‘A’ carried out by public organ ‘O’ in the ‘X’ circumstances supposes an abuse of power if, and only if: there is a regulatory rule that permits organ ‘O’ to use the rule that grants (public) power, in ‘X’ circumstances, so that carrying out ‘A ‘ produces as a result ‘R’, an administrative act or legal provision. ‘R’ produces a certain situation ‘E’ that, in accordance with the principles that justify the previous permission and other principles of the system, supposes an unjustified harm or an undue benefit, and there is no regulatory rule that prohibits producing ‘R’ (the legal provision in question), even though there may be a rule designed to avoid ‘E’. ‘R’ is a means for ‘E’: 3.1) either in a subjective sense, give that, when doing ‘A’, ‘O’ did not seek any other discernible purpose than achieving, by means of ‘R’, the consequence ‘E’, and that ‘R’ is objectively appropriate for ‘E’; 3.2) or in an objective sense: given that ‘R’ is objectively appropriate for ‘E’, even though ‘O’ did not have this purpose when carrying out ‘A’. (4) The balance between the principles mentioned in (2) has sufficient strength to generate a new rule that establishes that in the circumstances ‘X’ (‘X’ plus any circumstance that supposes a way of achieving (2) and (3.1) or (3.2) it is prohibited to use the rule that grants power in a way that consequence ‘E’ is achieved by means of ‘R’. Thus, the result ‘R’ (the legal provision or act in question) must be considered invalid (from a regulatory point of view) to the extent that it leads to ‘E’.” Atienza, Manuel and Ruiz Manero, Juan, Ilícitos atípicos, op. cit, section 29, p. 97. 169 170 Ibidem, chapter IV, section 32, p. 101. 171 Ibidem, chapter IV, section 33, p. 106. 35