to achieving a purpose other than that of complying in good faith” with a judgment, and that the Commission had committed an “abuse of power.” 180 137. Thus, from my perspective, I consider that once it had been concluded in the Judgment that there had been an “abuse of power,” and taking into account that the impeachments clearly involved the imposing of a sanction, it was even more necessary to analyze in detail the way in which the type of arbitrary acts that occurred during the said punitive proceeding entailed the violation of Article 9 of the American Convention. And this should have been done, taking into account, also, the State’s explicit acknowledgement that the National Congress did not make a legal and constitutional analysis of the grounds when it arbitrarily removed the members of the Constitutional Tribunal from office by an impeachment proceeding as a punitive mechanism; the absence of legal certainty with regard to the grounds for the removal as a guarantee of prevention vis-à-vis arbitrary interpretations, and the abusive motives of the National Congress for invoking the mechanism of impeachment, which results in a conflict between the conformation and application of the mechanism of impeachment in this case, and the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention. F) Conclusion 138. Taking into account the context in which this case occurred - “the collective termination of judges” of the three high courts in the space of 14 days; the real reasons for not only the decision to terminate the victims (resolution of the National Congress of November 25, 2004),181 but also the impeachment proceedings against them (sessions of Congress of December 1 and 8, 2004), which concluded with the approval of “the motion of censure submitted”182 — and the consequent “immediate removal”183 — as well as the “abuse of power” that was revealed in the Judgment, I consider that not only should the violation of Article 9 of the American Convention have been examined, but also that it was possible to declare that this article had been violated. 139. This is because, even though the Ecuadorian Constitution established very broad and general grounds, consisting in “statutory or constitutional offenses,” 184 based on which the members of the Constitutional Tribunal could be impeached, 185 they were tried, as determined in the Judgment186 and as I emphasize in this opinion (supra paras. 93 to 95), Judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities Giannini/Commission (Case C-153/99 P), European Court Reports, Page I-02891. 180 of 13 April 2000, “Related to an abuse of power aimed at obtaining control of the Judiciary by different procedures: in this case, the termination and the impeachment proceedings. Para. 219 of the Judgment. 181 182 National Congress Record 24-001-IV, session of December 8, 2004 (merits file, tome II, folios 649 and 659). A sanction that was additional to the termination decision taken previous by a resolution of the National Congress. It should not be overlooked that the censure produced the immediate removal of the officials under Article 130(9) of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998 and, in this specific case, it entailed a violation of the rights of the victims, because it represented the removal of the judges from office (which had already occurred previously with the congressional resolution of November 25,) with the negative effects implicit in this situation. 183 See my previous observations on the principle of criminalization — included in the principle of legality — established in Article 9 of the American Convention, to the effect that not only should the guarantees of due process of law be applied in impeachment proceedings, but also grounds for the removal that are sufficiently clear must be considered included in the principle de legality, in order to avoid or prevent the risk of abusive interpretations (supra paras. 115 and 116 of this opinion). 184 185 Art. 130(9) of the 1998 Constitution of Ecuador. 186 Paras. 204 and 205 of the Judgment. 40