However, the separation of powers entails not only a specialization of the State’s work in accordance with the way such powers have been assigned, but also implies the existence of a system of “checks and balances” that enable reciprocal control and monitoring among each branch of power. Thus, the separation of powers reveals the exercise of a limited power, as well as one that is susceptible to control, organized in diverse entities responsible for different functions, with the essential goal of ensuring the freedom of the individual visà-vis the State within a framework of participative and pluralist democracy. 18 16. In the very significant case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, the ICourtHR considered that one of the main purposes of the separation of public powers is precisely the guarantee of the independence of judges and noted that, to this end, the different political systems have created strict procedures, both for their appointment, and for their dismissal. In this regard, it cited the “United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,”19 which establishes that: The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.20 17. Regarding the possibility of removing judges, it underlined that these same “Principles” stipulate: A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.21 18. Hence, in this significant judgment, the Inter-American Court emphasized that the authority responsible for the procedure to dismiss a judge must be impartial in the proceeding established to this end and permit the exercise of the right of defense. It then underscored that, under the rule of law, it is necessary to ensure the independence of any judge and, “especially,” that of the constitutional judge owing to the nature of the matters submitted to his or her consideration. Referring to the European Court, it specified that the independence of any judge supposes that there is an appropriate appointment procedure, an established term of the mandate, and guarantees against external pressures. 22 19. At this time, the point that I wish to emphasize is that the ICourtHR has maintained that judicial independence constitutes an institutional guarantee under a democratic system that is connected to the principle of the separation of powers, which is now embodied in Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. In this case, also, it should be taken into account that it was the Constitutional Tribunal, which the victims formed part of in their capacity as judges, that was the democratic institution required to ensure the rule of law. 18 Regarding these concepts, see Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-141 of February 26, 2010. Adopted by the Seventh Congress of the United Nations on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985, and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985, and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 19 20 Principle 1, Ibidem. 21 Principle 17, Ibidem. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, paras. 73-75. 22 5