proved that they have the qualifications and aptitude to exercise the office with the guarantees of transparency imposed by public competition. However, this does not mean that provisional and temporary judges should not have an appointment procedure because, according to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary: “[a]ny method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives.” 46. In addition, the Inter-American Court stated that, in the same way in which the State is obliged to guarantee an adequate appointment procedure for provisional judges, it must guarantee them a certain stability in office. In this way, in the case of provisional judges, the guarantee of stability translates into the requirement that they can enjoy all the benefits of tenure until the resolutory condition that ends their mandate. 47. The ICourtHR also indicated that the stability of provisional judges is closely linked to the guarantee against external pressure, because if provisional judges do not have certainty about their permanence for a specific time, they will be vulnerable to pressure from different sectors, above all from those who have the power to decide on dismissals or promotions in the Judiciary.62 48. The Inter-American Court also stated that provisional appointments should be exceptional in nature and not the rule, and that they should not be extended indefinitely.63 49. It also indicated that any public authority, whether administrative, legislative or judicial, whose decisions may affect the rights of the individual, is required to adopt these decisions with full respect for the guarantees of due process of law. In addition, it reiterated that, any organ of the State that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature, is obliged to adopt decisions that abide by the guarantees of due process of law in the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention.64 50. Furthermore, the ICourtHR stipulated that the authority to annul the appointment of judges based on “observations” must be minimally justified and regulated, at least as regards the exact description of the facts that support these observations; also that the respective motivation shall not be of a disciplinary or punitive nature, because, if it was a disciplinary sanction, the requirement of motivation would be even greater, since disciplinary control is designed to assess the conduct, aptness and performance of the judge as a public official and, consequently, it would be necessary to analyze the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction.65 51. In the judgment that inspires this separate opinion, the Inter-American Court considered its case law on judicial independence, 66 and especially on guarantees in impeachment proceedings,67 based also on the relevant standards of the Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the criteria of the European Court of Human Rights, and the recommendations of the 62 Ibidem, paras. 104 to 106. 63 Ibidem, para. 107. 64 Ibidem, para. 115. 65 Ibidem, para. 120. 66 Paras. 188 to 199 of the Judgment. 67 Paras. 165 to 169 of the Judgment. 12