Court did not analyze the possible existence of an act that warranted a sanction, because Congress did not have competence to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court, a competence that it did have to impeach the members of the Constitutional Tribunal as analyzed in the Judgment. 107. Indeed, contrary to the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the instant case that inspires this opinion, impeachment proceedings were held against the members of the Constitutional Tribunal who had previously been removed by a congressional resolution. And, in this regard, the ICourtHR based its assessment on the assumption that Congress had competence to conduct these impeachment proceedings. This variable allowed the ICourtHR to determine that, when deciding the sanction, the unstated purpose was related to an “abuse of power.” Thus, the Judgment expressly states: 137 Therefore, the apparent legality and justification of these decisions concealed the intention of a parliamentary majority to exercise greater control over the Constitutional Tribunal and to facilitate the termination of the justices of the Supreme Court. The Court has verified that the resolutions of Congress were not adopted based on the exclusive assessment of specific factual information and in order to ensure proper compliance with the laws in force, but sought a very different end related to an abuse of power aimed at obtaining control of the judicial function by different procedures; in this case, the termination and the impeachment proceedings (underlining added). 108. To the contrary, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, it was not possible to reach this conclusion because the concept of “abuse of power” requires the respective organ to have competence to adopt the measure regarding which the “unstated” reasons are analyzed.138 Meanwhile, in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Congress did have competence to hold the impeachment proceedings. 109. Nevertheless, I consider that, in both the case of the Supreme Court of Justice v. Ecuador (Quintana Coello et al.)139 and in this case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ICourtHR could have analyzed the violation of Article 9 of the Pact of San José, despite the lack of competence of the National Congress to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice and the lack of competence to determine the legality of the appointment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. Indeed, irrespective of whether Congress was incompetent to carry out the removals, it should not be overlooked that, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, the State acknowledged that it had held an ad hoc sanction proceeding while, in the instant case, the State acknowledged the violation of Article 9 of the American Convention, because it considered that “it did not have grounds determined by law to remove the presumed victims from office,” and owing to “the absence of legal certainty with regard to the grounds for the removal of the former judges.” In this situation, since it was clearly an ad hoc proceeding and given the State’s acquiescence in this case, I consider that the possible violation of the principle of legality could have been analyzed in the case of both terminations. 110. In my opinion, in the Judgment could have been examined with greater from the perspective of the institutional Judgment140 — but, in particular, by an 137 that prompts this opinion, the “abuse of power” precision and from a different viewpoint. Not only aspect of judicial independence – as occurs in the analysis of the principle of legality established in Para. 219 of the Judgment. Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C, No. 266, para. 162. 138 Cf. My Concurring Opinion in the Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C No. 266. 139 140 Paras. 188 to 199, and 207 to 221 of the Judgment. 29