Article 9 of the American Convention. This is because the State acknowledged its international responsibility with regard to the violation of this principle, 141 and also because, in the Judgment, the ICourtHR — when analyzing the scope of the State’s partial acknowledgement of responsibility – considered that “some of the disputes on this point remain.”142 Hence, I find insufficient the justification given in the Judgment to establish that “it is not necessary to make a detailed analysis of the arguments of the parties concerning whether the termination decision constituted a punitive act, and other aspects related to the possible implications that the principle of legality would have had in this case.” 143 111. Given the evident “harm to the separation of powers and the arbitrary nature of the actions of Congress” that the Judgment expressly indicates,144 the competence of the National Congress to impeach the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, 145 and the Court’s conclusion of the “abuse of power” that occurred in this case, 146 I consider that it was essential to analyze the violation of the principle of legality with regard to the impeachment proceedings and to conclude that Article 9 of the Pact of San José had been violated; hence, my dissent from the seventh operative paragraph of the Judgment. 147 I will now explain my position in greater depth. B) The punitive nature of a decision in order to be able to apply Article 9 of the American Convention in a specific case 1. Case law of the Inter-American Court 112. According to the case law of the Inter-American Court, the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention is applicable, in principle, to criminal matters. However, the ICourtHR itself has also considered it applicable to matters relating to administrative sanctions. 113. Thus, in the case of Baena Ricardo v. Panama,148 the Inter-American Court considered: 106. With regard to the foregoing, it is desirable to analyze whether Article 9 of the Convention is applicable to the matters of administrative sanction, in addition, evidently, to being applicable to criminal matters. The terms used in this article seem to refer exclusively to the latter. However, it is necessary to take into account that administrative sanctions, as well as criminal sanctions, constitute 141 Para. 14 of the Judgment. 142 Para. 22 of the Judgment. 143 Para. 223 of the Judgment. 144 Ibidem. 145 According to Article 130(9) of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution; Cf. paras. 67 and 201 of the Judgment. 146 Cf. para. 219 of the Judgment. To the contrary, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, the National Congress did not have competence to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court, while it did have competence to conduct impeachment proceedings against the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. This absence of punitive competence, in principle, made it unnecessary for the Court to declare the existence of an implicit sanction and an abuse of power in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Consequently, in that case, my opinion was concurring and not dissenting; Cf. my Concurring Opinion in the Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C No. 266, especially para. 89. 147 Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C, No. 72, para. 106. 148 30