Chapter 4 the result of the election by changing the vote totals, or at least made the election result impossible to determine. Based on this record, no more than two votes would be subtracted, a difference that would be insufficient to change the election result or make it impossible to determine. At 357 (emphasis supplied).77 Nor was the court of appeal sympathetic to Mr. Nugent’s arguments that three votes should be added to his total to represent the votes of his three campaigners who were in jail during the election. Their arrests, the court of appeal said, flowed from the grand jury indictments, not from an order of the district attorney. Furthermore, the trial court’s remarks at the end of the trial indicate that the judge simply did not believe that the plaintiff had met its burden of proving a scheme by the District Attorney that would have included the district judge and the grand jury. At 359. This view was repeated by the court of appeal when it rejected Mr. Nugent’s argument that the district attorney abused his power by having Mr. Nugent subpoenaed to be before the grand jury during the week before the election. But after the court of appeal decided that Mr. Nugent had lost his lawsuit, as well as the election, it had some pointed criticism of the way in which the election and the trial were conducted. Although we ultimately conclude that there is no manifest error in the trial court’s finding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof to annul the election, this does not mean we find no evidence suggesting irregularities and/or fraud in this election…[T]here are other remedies for election offenses. At 359 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). How does this case compare with the situation in Jernigan where the court declared that fraudulent ballots are illegal and that “a vote that is illegally cast cannot be counted?” At 689 (emphasis supplied). The fraud in both Jernigan and Nugent was vote buying. But, in Nugent, the court concluded that the evidence showed the vote buying was isolated to seven instances, only two of which the court felt actually were sold votes—where the voters cast their ballots for a candidate because of the payment—and that the other five people cast their ballots as they would have in any event. That situation was seen by the court as resulting in two, not seven, fraudulent ballots. Accordingly, the court in Nugent would agree with the court in Jernigan that fraudulent ballots should not be counted—the two ballots that the Nugent court concluded were “bought” were discounted—but the court in Nugent would say that the situation in Nugent was distinguishable from the situation in Jernigan: without a plot by the district attorney to use the grand jury to disrupt the police chief ’s campaign, Nugent did not have a situation comparable to the “flagrant, extensive, and corrupt violations” in Jernigan, where the vote buying appeared to pervade an entire precinct, to change the vote in the precinct and to “destroy the fairness and equality of the election.” Note, too, the distinction in Nugent between the treatment accorded the ballots and the treatment accorded the vote buyers. A crime occurred, and even if it was not so pervasive as to require that the election results be thrown out or that the election be rerun, we all can agree 77 As was noted in the analysis of Moreau v. Tonry, 339 So.2d 3 (La. 1976), in Chapter 2, a Louisiana statute said that an election may be upset only if the one contesting the election can show that “but for irregularities or fraud he would have been nominated…”. At 4 (emphasis added). Alternatively, the statute allowed proof that the voters had been deprived of their free will by fraud or serious irregularities. This is the standard that preexisted Nugent and is addressed in the court’s opinion in Nugent. 91