The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges 670 A.2d 629 543 Pa. 216, 670 A.2d 629 (Cite as: 543 Pa. 216, 670 A.2d 629) voters in the District Justice election. These voters, who could identify their ballots because they had designated themselves as write-in candidates for various offices, all testified that marks for Laughlin on their ballots were not made by them. Laughlin maintains that this testimony should not have been allowed because Article VII, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for "secrecy in voting." Judge Woodside's opinion in Thomas A. Crowley Election Contest, 57 Dauphin Co.Rep. 120 (1945), is most often cited in support of the contention that a voter may not waive his right to the secrecy of his ballot. According to Judge Woodside, the secrecy of the ballot is sound public policy. It is to prevent intimidation and bribery. When a person has a right to reveal how he voted he can be intimidated into revealing it.... If in every close *237 election in this Commonwealth voters could be subpoenaed into Court ... and asked how they voted, bribery and intimidation would become a simple matter, even though the witness after taking the stand would have the legal right to refuse to answer the question. The sanctity of the ballot must be preserved, and the courts must throw no technicalities in the way of discovering false and fraudulent election returns, but neither can we abandon the keystone of our democracy--the secrecy of the ballot, on the pretense of discovering an error in the return. 57 Dauphin Co.Rep. at 126-27; see also Orsatti, 143 Pa.Commw. at 17, 598 A.2d at 1344 (voter cannot be permitted to waive right to secrecy) (citation omitted); In re General Election of Nov. 4, 1975, 71 D. & C.2d 83, 91-92 (1975) (voters should not be permitted to testify where no fraud is present). However, as the court below observed, Judge Woodside also noted in Crowley that [w]e are not prepared to state nor called upon to say that there are no circumstances under which a legal voter will be permitted to take the witness stand on his own circumstances and testify how he voted. There may be circumstances where it is proper.... But, ... where it is possible to determine from the ballots what the vote of the district was, and there is no proof of fraud, we have no authority 252 Page 11 to accept the oral testimony of the voter as to his vote.... Crowley, 57 Dauphin Co.Rep. at 127. Here, in contrast to Crowley and General Election of Nov. 4, 1975, the evidence clearly establishes that at some point after election night and before the first recount, fraud occurred with regard to at least some of the ballots. We agree with the lower court that, under the unusual circumstances of this case, the sanctity of the ballot is not best preserved by secrecy, but instead by allowing those whose legitimate votes were altered through no fault of their own to testify, if they so choose, regarding how they originally voted. Therefore, we hold that, under these limited circumstances, where a vote has been properly cast but subsequently altered through no fault *238 of the voter, the voter should be allowed to voluntarily appear and testify regarding how he or she originally voted. [15] Laughlin also claims that the court below erred in denying her motion to disqualify the Beaver County District Attorney and her staff from participating in the election contest. Laughlin maintains that such disqualification was necessary because the District Attorney openly endorsed Zupsic for District Justice. The lower court, however, found no authority for Laughlin's position and concluded that it had no authority to **640 order the District Attorney to refrain from any investigation. Petition II, slip op. at 10. Further, if the testimony of the District Attorney's investigator was affected by any conflict, the lower court noted that this would go to the weight of that testimony rather than its admissibility. [16] As the lower court noted, we also find no authority for the proposition that the District Attorney and her staff should have been disqualified from investigating this case. Rule 1.11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which Laughlin cites, is clearly inapplicable because it prohibits attorneys in the public sector from participating in matters "in which [they] participated personally and substantially while in private practice." The District Attorney's endorsement of Zupsic has nothing to do with what she may have done in private practice. Further, we agree with the lower court that any supposed conflict of interest would go to the weight of testimony rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., Weir by Gasper v. Estate of Ciao, 521 Pa. 491, 501, 556 © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.