The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges And, quoting an earlier case, Adair v. McElreath, 145 S.E. 841 (Ga. 1928), “All provisions of the election law are mandatory if enforcement is sought before election in a direct proceeding for that purpose; but after election all should be held directory only, in support of the result, unless of a character to effect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the vote, or to the ascertainment of the result, unless the provisions affect an essential element in the election, or unless it is expressly declared by the statute that the particular act is essential to the validity of an election or that its omission renders it void…And so an election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid because the certificate of nomination of a successful candidate is defective through an omission of some detail.” At 439. The Georgia Supreme Court decided that, under the state statutes, Mr. Morley’s objection came too late.66 But, the supreme court said, even if Dr. Tate’s nomination were contrary to the rules and regulations, he should not be removed from office because he got a majority of the votes in the general election.67 E.4. Secrecy of the ballot: Technical requirements affecting the fundamental integrity of an election are mandatory after an election if the statute is totally disregarded A very different result was reached in George v. Municipal Election Commission of the City of Charleston, 516 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1999), after Charleston, South Carolina, held a referendum on November 3, 1998, on whether to change from partisan to nonpartisan elections. Usually the county helped with the city elections, letting the city use the county’s electronic voting machines and county precinct workers. But the ballot on November 3 had so many federal, state and county candidates running for office that the referendum issue could not fit on the county’s electronic voting machines. So the city set up a separate voting area in each of the polling places within the city for voting on the referendum. After the voters in the city cast their ballots on the county’s electronic machines, they went to the separate table in the polling place where they signed in again, were given punch cards to vote on the referendum, punched the card at the table and dropped the card into a cardboard ballot box on the table. There were no voting booths in those separate areas: the city voters who wanted to shield their vote from the other people standing in line or working at the table could turn around, step away from the table, punch the card behind the ballot box or cup the punch card in one hand while punching out the yes or the no slot with the other hand. The punch cards could not be folded after they had been voted—folded cards could not be run through the counting machine—so the vote on the cards was visible as the cards were put into the ballot box. The referendum passed by a large margin, 8,929 votes to 6,310. G. Robert George and others contested the results before the municipal election commission, saying that the state constitution and laws required the commission to have protected the secrecy of the ballot by providing voting booths and ballots that could be folded. The contest was submitted on stipulations—no witnesses or evidence were presented. As the South Carolina Supreme Court noted, Mr. George and the others presented a case where “no one testified he or she saw the vote made by another person, no one testified he or she refused to vote due to ‘��‘Objections relating to nomination must be timely made; otherwise they may be regarded as waived. It is too late to make them after the nominee’s name has been placed on the ballot and he has been elected to office…’’’ at 439. 67 The Georgia Supreme Court might have reached a different result and found that Dr. Tate could not hold the office if Dr. Tate were found to have been lacking some essential qualification for the office. In much the same way, the Georgia Supreme Court found that an election was void because the candidate, who was not a duly registered voter of the county on the day of the election, was not a qualified candidate for office in Thompson v. Stone, 53 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1949), other aspects of which are discussed in Chapter 5. 66 70