The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges At 127. The supreme court agreed with the special judge that this violation was technical and that the will of the electorate at the precinct could be determined. So Mr. Rizzo lost on that claim. As for the East Central Precinct, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that, “In addition to violating the 150-foot rule, the evidence of Perkins’ conduct suggests possible criminal violations of election laws prohibiting disturbing an election…and intimidating electors to prevent voting…” We might agree that discarding the east central Cleveland precinct votes is appropriate, but this does not automatically mean a new election must follow. The special judge did find that even if the results were thrown out, it was still possible to ascertain the will of the electorate. …[I]f the irregularities are due to fraud or willful violations of the election procedures, this Court will not hesitate to order a new election, even though the percentage of illegal votes is small. The scope of the violations and the ratio of illegal votes are significant, because even in the absence of fraud, the disenfranchisement of a significant number of votes will cast enough doubt on the results of an election to warrant voiding it. As a rule [drawing on Mississippi precedent], if more than thirty percent of total votes have been disqualified, a special election will be required… On the other hand, when the percentage of illegal votes is smaller, even though the winning margin is less than the number of illegal votes, a special election may not be required… [Here] it is apparent that a new election is unnecessary. First, it is clear that by discarding the illegal votes the outcome is unchanged, for without any votes from the precinct Bizzell won the election. There was no fraud practiced and the ratio of illegal votes to total votes, discarding all 355 votes at the east central Cleveland precinct, is 355 to 2817, or slightly more than 12%. The nature of the violations, while serious, cannot totally control the disposition of this case, for we must balance the public interest with that of the successful contestant. At 127-128 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). The Mississippi Supreme Court then quoted from Noxubee County Democratic Committee v. Russell, 443 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Miss. 1983), the case it primarily followed in reaching its decision: [W]e recognize competing interests which must be weighed and balanced. While the voters are not parties to this contest, their interests are paramount. Special elections are a great expense for the county and its taxpayers. Beyond that, the turnout for a special election is never as great as when there are a number of candidates on the slate. By contrast, we feel that the rights of the individual candidates cannot be allowed to overshadow the public good. At 128-129 (emphasis in the original). Perhaps most persuasive, however, was the Mississippi Supreme Court’s view that conducting a new election in the East Central Precinct would not alter the outcome of the election. The supreme court noted that Mr. Rizzo had won the East Central Cleveland Precinct primary run-off by a two-to-one margin (243 votes to 112), that Mr. Rizzo had also won the precinct’s first-round primary by a two-to-one mar- 38