OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 27:2 2012) Indeed, the range of reasons why mediation is ill-suited to election disputes is undoubtedly why no sustained effort has thus far been made to incorporate it. As the following section portrays, however, there are enough shortcomings to litigating post-election disputes that mediation deserves another look. IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF POST-ELECTION LITIGATION There is little question that post-election litigation is a necessary component of ensuring that our elections are fair. Voters, candidates, and parties have consistently turned to courts to resolve perplexing post-election disputes, sometimes asking courts to impose extraordinary remedies such as ordering a new election,50 disqualifying a candidate,5I declaring a winner,52 and even resolving the question of who should take office when the winning candidate has died.53 There is no scarcity of post-election litigation. In 50 See, e.g., Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 680, 686 (Ala. 2008) (upholding the Perry Circuit Court's decision to order a runoff election after a recount revealed there was no winner of a mayoral race); Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1322, 1327, 133032 (Cal. 1993) (affirming the Superior Court of Fresno County's annulment of a school board election and order for a new election when there was substantial evidence that fraudulent votes affected the election's outcome); Thompson v. Jones, 17 So. 3d 524, 526, 529 (Miss. 2008) (ordering a special election for county sheriff after the circuit court released its conclusion that illegal absentee ballots had voided the Democratic primary after the general election had already occurred); Reese v. Duncan, 80 S.W.3d 650, 653, 656 (Tex. App. 2002) (upholding an order for a new election when the number of illegal votes counted could have materially affected the outcome of the election). 51 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 164, 173 (Ky. 2005) (affirming the post-election disqualification of a winning state senatorial candidate who failed to meet the residdicy requirement); Ellis v. Meeks, 957 S.W.2d 213,214,217 (Ky. 1997) (disqualifying a winning ward alderman candidate for visiting polling places on election day); Smith v. Brito, 173 P.3d 351, 352, 356 (Wyo. 2007) (upholding the disqualification of a winning town council candidate who was not a registered voter at the time of filing). 52 See, e.g., Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1084-85, 1092 (Ala. 2005) (declaring the incumbent candidate for city council the winner after the circuit court had decided that his opponent had won after hearing an election contest); Mcintosh v. Sanders, 831 So. 2d 1111, 1112, 1116 (Miss. 2002) (affirming the Kemper County Circuit Court's declaration of a winner of the county election commissioner race after one of the candidates was disqualified); Huefner, supra note 24, at 297 (describing a trial court's reversal of election results based on statistical fmdings concerning ballot layout (citing Bradley v. Perrodin, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))). 53 See, e.g., Tataii v. Yoshina, No. 25599, 2003 Haw. LEXIS 237, at *2-7 (Haw. May 22, 2003) (confirming that the deceased wirmer of the general election for a seat in the U.S. Congress was the proper nominee and that a special election was the proper way 336 HeinOnline -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 336 2012