OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 27:2 2012] between available remedies (adjustment of vote totals, new elections, fines, penalties or injunctions, and so forth) with very little to go on aside from common law and principles of equity.68 Another challenge in resolving disputed elections in courts is the related problem of perceived judicial neutrality. In the past, when state supreme courts have split on election cases along partisan lines, as was the case, for example, in the 1982 Illinois governor's race between Republican incumbent James Thomson and Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson III, the credibility and neutrality of the judiciary is threatened. As Professor Foley observes of this phenomenon: Whether these split decisions ... precisely correspond to the partisan affiliation of the judges on those courts is beside the point. Nor does it matter whether any of these judges were actually motivated by political considerations, rather than their good faith perception of what the law required of them. Rather, the problem is that these teeter-totter rulings reveal that the applicable law is not so crystal clear that the judges have no choice but to follow its command, and therefore the judges are free to decide the case in accordance with their political preferences if they are so inclined.69 The public's confidence in neutral, non-political adjudication of disputes is put at risk each time an election case, by nature fraught with partisan conflict, confronts the courts. A final reason why courts are problematic forums for election disputes is that judges are often ill-equipped to handle election law matters.7° Most of 68 !d.; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, An Unsafe Harbor: Recounts, Contests, and the Electoral College, 106 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 84, 87 (2008) (noting the awkward problem of state election laws deferring to federal laws that do not exist, Tokaji provides the example of Section 3515.08 of the Ohio Revised Code under which contests of elections to federal office are to be "conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of federal law." Tokaji goes on to note the trouble with this scheme: "The problem is that there are no federal laws allowing judicial contest proceedings over disputed federal elections. Nor is it clear that Congress would have the constitutional power to impose such a procedure for presidential elections, even it if so desired. Instead, federal law refers back to the 'fmal determination' made under state Jaw pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5. In other words, we have circular references .... The effect of Ohio's law thus appears to be the elimination of any judicial contest proceedings in any federal election taking place in that state."). 69 Foley, supra note 42, at 3 77-78. 70 Recognizing the lack of resources state judges face in election cases, the National Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts identified this as a problem of great significance and encouraged the National Center for State Courts, partnering with 340 HeinOnline -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 340 2012