OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Vol. 27:2 2012] A third way the conference call differed from mediation was Secretary Ritchie's reliance on authoritative input. When the campaigns raised concerns, Secretary Ritchie would often ask the AG's counsel to provide an assessment of what the law dictated on the subject at issue. Likewise, election administrators on the call also served an "expert" function. The campaigns' assertions for certain changes to the process could have huge implications for, for example, election official staff"mg demands. The voice of election administrators in defining this process was therefore critical. In some instances, particularly in the collaborative mediation model, 139 mediators rely on participating experts. But for the most part, traditional mediation excludes such input. A fourth way the conference call differed from traditional mediation was the role of the public interest. A controversial question in mediation circles is whether or not mediators should take the public interest into account when mediating.140 Many believe that mediators, particularly those mediating large public policy disputes, must keep the public interest in mind even when those interests are not necessarily represented at the table. Arguably, Secretary Ritchie performed this role on the call. Secretary Ritchie understood that an important component of the process was integrity of the system and public confidence. 14 1 With this understanding at the fore, he describes one of his to mediation with authority to settle. For a review of cases in which inadequate authority resulted in findings of bad faith, see Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little {Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 367, 385 {2002). 139 That said, it should be noted that in a relatively new form of ADR called collaborative law, collaborative practitioners commonly bring in outside experts to assist parties in crafting their agreement. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 111-14 (2d. 2008). 140 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, II ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 131 (1993) {asking whether, "mediators of large public-policy disputes have any obligation to the public if there is no obvious representation of public interests in a particular dispute?); see also Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 71, 82-83 (2010) ("For years, scholars and practitioners have questioned whether a mediator should be a mere facilitator of party-initiated outcomes or should assertively prevent agreements that are unfair or favor more powerful parties."). 141 Jocelyn Benson, in a fascinating book about the role of secretaries of state, describes the various hats secretaries of state wear with regard to managing elections. In a chapter entitled, "The Secretary as Voter Advocate," Benson outlines the various ways secretaries of state advocate for the public interest: "[V]oters and sitting Secretaries must form a partnership of collaboration and communication. In doing so, voters are able to inform and bolster a Secretary's ability to voice their concerns and advocate on their behalf." Most of the efforts she describes include election administration reform efforts, 360 HeinOnline -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 360 2012