IFES environments.10 This was also the case in Ghana in 2008, when polling in one region was postponed and the eventual national results of an extremely close election were hotly contested. Despite the bitterness of the dispute, the public and political parties waited for the electoral commission to follow its process and come to its decisions. In contrast, in Kenya in 2007, one can see the impact of low trust in an EMB and state institutions. In the 2007 election, the casting of ballots went well, but ensuing irregularities (both real and alleged), bad communication strategies and underlying grievances combined to fuel violence. Following the election, rumors spread as allegations and conflicting reports from polling stations suggested that there were irregularities in the results process. The EMB, rather than addressing the issues head on, simply announced results. Then, to make matters worse, revealed it had been pressured to do so. The public and opposition groups were skeptical of the electoral process already and this confusion fueled anger among opposition supporters. The lack of a clear statement of the problem and possible solutions (e.g., election contests, mediation, results audit) left the situation vulnerable to escalating violence. The media blackout that followed only served to feed fear and violence. As Judge Johann Kriegler pointed out in Elections in Dangerous Places, weaknesses in the Kenya EMB were not evident on the surface of the 2002 election process.11 Yet there were systemic issues and weaknesses that were not resolved with between-elections support. It is possible that increased attention to fundamentals and capacity building might have made a difference in the EMB’s choices in response to political pressure and allegations of wrongdoing in 2007. When election assistance programs and EMBs prioritize long-term professionalism, capacity building, inclusiveness and transparency in election administration, they are in effect prioritizing conflict prevention. The benefits of trust and transparency are most clear when things go wrong, not when they go well. This type of conflict prevention must take place at all phases of the electoral cycle and form an integral part of the EMB’s list of priorities. Election security planning and training are also key to electoral conflict prevention because they contribute to a system that can better absorb shocks. Planning and training must be inclusive, flexible and initiated early enough in the electoral cycle to be fully implemented. A coordinated approach between EMBs and the security sector makes a huge difference in the planning and training done within each institution. Forming a joint operations center manned by both EMB and security officials has proven instrumental in many elections in ensuring effective information sharing, timely decision making and level-headed responses at critical junctions. While the need for training for poll workers and security agencies during elections is well-accepted, many conflicts still arise from disputes at polling stations and the role of security forces before, during and after elections. Holistic and joint approaches to training for EMBs and security forces could be helpful for EMB professionalism and for more effective electoral security. Within EMBs, training of electoral staff and poll workers could involve more conflict resolution techniques and conflict awareness. In most cases, some attention to conflict management is paid in poll worker training materials. For example, many feature scenarios with a difficult voter(s) but do not provide guidance on strategies for diffusing conflict, clear protocols for engaging security or an awareness of potential ethnic or linguistic or other differences that could cause confusion or conflict in administering the polls. This type of guidance could be tailored to the conflict dynamics and likely triggers in a particular country, region or municipality. It could provide great rewards for a relatively small change in the current process. 10 Kriegler, Johann, “Electoral Dispute Resolution: A Personal Perspective,” in Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracy and the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding. David Gillies (ed). McQueen University Press, October 2011. 11 Ibid. 9