IFES security did not begin until six months out. Once the issue was prioritized, an election security group was created, and eventually replicated at the state level in South Sudan. The priorities for election security were joint meetings and workshops to establish agreement on the roles of the SPSS and the SPLA, and to coordinate resources and trainings. Joint operations centers led by electoral authorities to coordinate with security forces were set up at state and county levels. Donors provided an array of communications equipment to these bodies, though training had not been widespread as of March 2011. The police training program was also not projected to train the number of officers needed for deployment on Election Day. Despite challenges of resources and time, the mere existence of the JOCs and facilitated trainings and workshops contributed to a then-unprecedented level of collaboration between electoral officials, the SSPS and SPLA.14 However, this scenario does illustrate the need to start such coordination, training and planning far in advance of Election Day. Training and planning is crucial for avoiding post-election conflicts that often center on results announcements. Ensuring a transparent electoral results system; paying extra attention to explaining how results aggregation and tabulation will actually work; and sharing timelines and results, by polling station level, at all steps of the process are crucial to achieve the required confidence in the results process by all stakeholders. The process is crucial, as are strategies for disseminating information, working with the media, issuing public statements and developing contingency plans for addressing conflicts or controversy. Having these processes and plans in place and in advance will build trust between the EMB and parties before results are announced – this trust is essential to reducing negative reactions at the first sign of problems. It is also important that the public trusts and understands the results process and how the results translate into seats or winners. That is, it is important to educate voters – in advance – on the process, as well as minimum votes needed, seat allocation, run-off requirements, etc. For instance, tensions rose swiftly in East Timor in 2007 when the use of a complicated formula for seat allocation led to coalition-building that did not seem to properly reward the party that won the most votes. An extensive education campaign organized by IFES and other partners was critical in reducing tensions, but such post-Election Day campaigns do not always work. In terms of improving work using the ICEP lens, local and international organizations on the ground focused on non-election issues should closely monitor for escalating conflict and tension in all phases of the election, particularly in the waiting period for results. Warning signs should be communicated to appropriate authorities or through trusted networks. This communication loop could be another use of an ICEP working group or inclusion of conflictrelated information sharing in existing, coordinated efforts. Monitoring and watchdog initiatives, whether initiated by state institutions or civil society organizations, can provide accurate, continuous information on existing/increasing tensions, electoral violence or electoral violations. They can increase conflict prevention success because they address impunity, secrecy and rumors – problems that often foster electoral conflict in transitional democracies. Monitoring and watchdog mechanisms help limit the space and opportunity for fraud and corruption, reducing the potential for conflict. Such mechanisms range from transparency measures the EMB introduces, to political finance regimes, to conflict monitoring and early warning systems, to election dispute resolution (EDR) case monitoring to election observation, and many others. The work of EMBs in identifying best practices and regulatory provisions to ensure integrity of an electoral process plays an important role in preventing conflict. This process includes developing auditable procedures that prevent or deter fraud and corruption based on a comprehensive fraud risk assessment, and measures to 14 Based on interviews with Lt. Gen. Gordon Kur Micah, Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Sudan Police Service, United States Government (USG) officials in Juba and Khartoum. 11