IFES To deal with the particular dynamics of elections and conflict, the electoral cycle approach alone is not sufficient. Electoral conflict (and violence) can be better understood when placed within the conflict cycle, and better addressed when practitioners look at what conflict programming would be most relevant. Understanding the connection and overlap between the conflict cycle and the electoral cycle will help develop and deliver technical assistance programs to EMBs that address conflict more explicitly, consistently and effectively. Figure 2: Conflict Cycle Figure 3: Conflict Response Cycle A wide variety of conflict dynamics and triggers exist during the electoral process in countries in which election assistance programs operate. Many transitional democracies have socio-economic, ethnic, political or religious cleavages that may be aggravated by elections (e.g., Kenya, India, Guyana and Kyrgyzstan). There may be insurgent groups that threaten the integrity of the electoral process (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan and Bangladesh). There may be a dominant party or state actor(s) that routinely harms, intimidates or influences participants in the electoral process (e.g., Azerbaijan and Zimbabwe). This range of conflict triggers means facilitating a credible, peaceful electoral process requires much more than simply addressing technical election issues. It requires understanding conflict dynamics and explicitly working to analyze, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts while supporting an electoral process. In recognition of the limits of current approaches, there has been a surge of interest in elections and conflict and how to “mainstream conflict prevention.”4 Although recent research has bolstered the argument that electoral 4 See in particular, Bardall, G., “A Conflict Cycle Perspective on Electoral Violence: Taking the Long and Broad View on Electoral Violence”, Monday Developments, March 2010, accessed at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2010/A-Conflict-Cycle-Perspectiveon-Electoral-Violence.aspx; Elections and Conflict Prevention, UNDP, 2010; and Alston, P., Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Addendum, Election-related killings, A/HRC/14/24/Add.7, 21, UN, May 2010; “Background information on the Chamber’s process of ruling on summons to appear or warrants of arrest,” International Criminal Court, December 16, 2010, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/C3D48F4D-8132-46AC-A84D-94D87F3C64C4.htm; and “Insight into the ICC’s Investigation of Election Violence in Kenya,” http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Interviews/2010/Insight-into-the-ICCsInvestigation-of-Election-Violence-in-Kenya.aspx,May 2010). 3