International Foundation for Electoral Systems The U.S. federal system grants extensive powers to the state legislatures to enact laws and regulations in accordance with the Constitution; many states take advantage of this power to mandate that public employees must remain impartial.33 On the national level, a vast legal framework governs the specific actions of officials and personnel, which serves the purpose of maintaining an impartial government (as discussed below).34 Although the law does not provide a more general requirement for impartiality, the Supreme Court has noted that maintaining an impartial government is a fundamental principle (while not citing any specific legislative authority in making this assertion).35 However, there is a general requirement within the Judicial Code of Conduct that the Judicial Branch, and the federal judges and magistrates therein must remain impartial.36 Restrictions on State Personnel Running as Candidates for Public Office It is also necessary to address the activities and responsibilities of public employees who are planning to run for office.37 The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR’s 2016 Guidelines reference the need to consider “adequate and proportionate” rules in the legal framework pertaining to the “suspension from office or resignation of certain public authorities running for elections in order to ensure neutrality.”38 The Ukraine 2015 local election process illustrates these concerns. The OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission noted that government officials participated in the elections as both supporters and candidates. While it is common practice globally for incumbent candidates to campaign for re-election while in office, electioneering by these officials during official business hours raised concerns related to the misuse of state resources.39 Both the Kenyan and Brazilian constitutions seek to address this issue. In Kenya, the constitution specifically prohibits parliamentary and presidential candidates from holding positions as public officers, members of the EMB, or members of the county assembly. Parliamentary, presidential, and county assembly candidates who have been found “in accordance with any law” to misuse or abuse their state office may also be disqualified.40 Similarly, in Brazil, the constitution provides that if a President, Governor, or Mayor runs for another office, he or she must resign from the current office at least six months in advance of the election.41 However, this provision does not appear to apply to sitting representatives or senators. Examples include Alaska, Kentucky, and Nevada. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 24.60.010 (West); KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6.606 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281A.020 (West). 34 See U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973) (stating “a major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government—the impartial execution of the laws—it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government”). 35 See id. 36 See Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 2, Canon 2 at 3 (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Guide to Judiciary Policy] (“A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should neither lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge”). 37 See TIDE, supra note 4, at 140. 38 Venice Comm’n & OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines, supra note 10, at § A.4.2. However, Ohman warns that in some cases the implementation of such regulations could be counter-productive, if public employers are only willing to re-hire candidates that support the ruling party and refuse to re-hire representatives of the opposition. See TIDE, supra note 4, at 140. 39 See OSCE/ODIHR, Ukraine Local Elections 25 October and 15 November 2015: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 15 (2016). 40 See Carter Cntr., Observing Kenya’s March 2013 National Elections: Final Report 32, 36 (2013). 41 See Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 14, ¶ 6 (Braz.). 33 6