International Foundation for Electoral Systems as two common ways that governments may utilize public employees for campaigning purposes.47 For example, local NGOs reported that approximately 1,200 public employees were involved in campaigning in the August 2015 Sri Lankan parliamentary elections.48 According to Transparency International Sri Lanka, the Program for Protection of Public Resources received 58 complaints of public employees participating in electioneering, including cases of executive-level officials supporting the ruling party.49 Similar cases of abuse are common worldwide: the 2014 general elections in Mozambique saw the widespread availability of public resources to incumbent candidates, including the participation of public employees in campaign events during business hours.50 In Kazakhstan’s 2015 early presidential election, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission noted that the presidential incumbent took advantage of his access to public employees during the campaign, and students and company employees reported “being instructed by supervisors to volunteer for the incumbent’s campaign, attend campaign events held on his behalf, and vote for him.”51 More than 1,000 public employees engaged in campaigning, spending a collective total of 4,761 hours canvassing votes in Mongolia’s 2004 electoral process.52 Regulations targeting abuses of the civil services can take several forms. Provisions in the legal framework may restrict public employees from contributing to election campaigns while on duty, or from participating in certain types of activities after hours (for example, making campaign speeches at partisan gatherings, or taking an active part in managing a political campaign or group). Finally, certain officials may be restricted from participating in electoral campaign activities, both on and off the job, based on their position. As stated by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODHIR, “The non-involvement of judges, prosecutors, police, military and auditors of political competitors in their official capacity in electoral campaigning is of essential importance” in ensuring “official neutrality throughout the entire electoral processes.”53 See Speck & Fontana, supra note 3, at 7. The violations occurred despite provisions in the Establishment Code of Sri Lanka and a circular issued by the Commissioner of Elections expressly prohibiting the participation of public officials in campaign activities. Chapter XXXII of the Establishment Code prevents public employees from engaging in activities related to political campaigns other than voting. Many public officials, including those like Secretaries to Ministries who hold executive positions, are entirely prohibited from campaign or election activity, while others, including clerical staff, may participate while off official duty. 47 48 See Transparency Int’l, Electoral Integrity: A Review of the Abuse of State Resources and Selected Integrity Issues During 2015 Presidential Elections in Sri Lanka 9 (2015) [hereinafter Transparency Int’l, Sri Lanka Electoral Integrity Report]; see also European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), Final Report: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Elections 18-19 (2015). 49 See Transparency Int’l, Sri Lanka Electoral Integrity Report, supra note 48, at 34-35. 50 See EU EOM, Mozambique: Final Report, General Elections 24 (2014). The EU EOM noted that this participation of public employees was enabled by the structure of the national administration and recommended that the broad legal framework be clarified: “Article 42 of the electoral law does not specify the scope of the general prohibition to use administrative resources and civil servants for campaigning purposes, which may be interpreted in a restrictive manner as to permit certain misuse of administrative human resources and others for the electoral campaign.” Id. at 13. 51 OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election 26 April 2015: Election Observation Mission Final Report 12 (2015). 52 See Christian Schafferer, The 2004 Parliamentary Election in Mongolia: Big Surprises and Small Victories, 3 J. Contemp. Eastern Asia 1, 4 (2004). 53 Venice Comm’n & OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines, supra note 10, at § A.4.3. 8