Unfair Advantage: The Abuse of State Resources in Elections In the judicial branch each circuit has a judicial council, made up of judges sitting within that circuit, which is responsible for monitoring and receiving complaints of judicial misconduct and issuing penalties for violations.164 V. Available Remedies and Sanctions for Violations of Restrictions on State Personnel In addition to establishing clear, legal guidelines outlining restrictions in the participation and contribution of state personnel to electoral campaigns to prevent the abuse of state resources, it is also important for states to have remedies available to address violations. The Venice Commission and OSCE have stated that “Public employees who misuse administrative resources during electoral processes should be subject to sanction, including criminal and disciplinary sanctions, up to the dismissal from office,”165 and that “Political parties and candidates who deliberately benefit from a misuse of administrative resources should be subject to a range of sanctions proportionate to the offence committed.”166 Ohman and Ritchie posit that the most effective systems will have a range of remedies available, and identify a clear remedy for each potential violation determined by the law.167 These options can include “formal warnings, fixed monetary penalties, reduction in public financing, or referral for criminal prosecution.”168 Regardless of the types of restrictions that may be built into the legal framework, the lack of effective sanctions and remedies associated with these provisions may create apertures for misuse of state resources. According to the EU EOM, Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission “lacks sanctioning powers for enforcement of campaign regulations and mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning non-compliance were de facto non-existent” during the 2015 general elections. Despite the fairly significant misuse of administrative resources and abuse of powers of the incumbency, violations took place with impunity.169 Similarly, a 2015 OSCE/ODIHR report concluded that the Belarusian legal framework does not adequately protect against the misuse of state resources.170 Nearly all of the 2,000 applications and complaints filed during the 2015 presidential election – many of which related to the misuse of state resources for collecting signatures and campaigning – were rejected by the election commissions.171 Overall, no detailed information was published by the Central Election Commission, and the dispute resolution process was “insufficiently transparent and did not provide effective remedy.” 172 Additionally, although the leading government auditing body in Brazil, the TCU, has a full complement of sanction powers for the misuse of public funds, the sanctions it imposes may be appealed and overturned by the judiciary, which is reportedly common.173 Moreover, even if the sanction is not See 28 U.S.C. §§ 354(a), (b); see also Guide to Judiciary Policy, supra note 36, at Canon 1. Anyone may file a complaint with the judicial council alleging judicial misconduct. See U.S. Comm. on Judicial Conduct and Disability, Filing a Complaint of Judicial Misconduct or Judicial Disability Against a Federal Judge, 2, available at http://www. uscourts.gov/file/3319/download (last visited June 17, 2016). 165 Venice Comm’n & OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines, supra note 10, at § C.2.2. 166 Id. at § C.2.3. 167 Magnus Ohman & Megan Ritchie, supra note 142. 168 Venice Comm’n & OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines, supra note 10, at § C.2.3. 169 See EU EOM Nigeria Final Report, supra note 54, at 20. 170 See OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Belarus Presidential Election 11 October 2015: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 6 (2016). 171 See id. at 3. 172 Id. 173 See Lindsey Carson & Mariana Mota Prado, Mapping Corruption and its Institutional Determinants in Brazil 27 (IRIBA, Working Paper No. 08, 2014) (citing Santiso, 2007; Speck, 2011; Melo, 2013). 164 21