32
RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
Opinion of the Court
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political
party” provides little guidance on the question. See post,
at 31, n. 6.) Indeed, numerous other States are restricting
partisan considerations in districting through legislation.
One way they are doing so is by placing power to draw
electoral districts in the hands of independent commissions. For example, in November 2018, voters in Colorado
and Michigan approved constitutional amendments creating multimember commissions that will be responsible in
whole or in part for creating and approving district maps
for congressional and state legislative districts. See Colo.
Const., Art. V, §§44, 46; Mich. Const., Art. IV, §6. Missouri is trying a different tack. Voters there overwhelmingly approved the creation of a new position—state demographer—to draw state legislative district lines. Mo.
Const., Art. III, §3.
Other States have mandated at least some of the traditional districting criteria for their mapmakers. Some have
outright prohibited partisan favoritism in redistricting.
See Fla. Const., Art. III, §20(a) (“No apportionment plan
or individual district shall be drawn with the intent to
favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”); Mo.
Const., Art. III, §3 (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, secondarily,
competitiveness. ‘Partisan fairness’ means that parties
shall be able to translate their popular support into legislative representation with approximately equal efficiency.”);
Iowa Code §42.4(5) (2016) (“No district shall be drawn for
the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator or member of Congress, or other person or group.”);
Del. Code Ann., Tit. xxix, §804 (2017) (providing that in
determining district boundaries for the state legislature,
no district shall “be created so as to unduly favor any
person or political party”).
As noted, the Framers gave Congress the power to do
something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections