THE GEORGIAN LABOUR PARTY v. GEORGIA JUDGMENT 17 3.1. “The organisation of elections by an impartial body” “(a) An impartial body must be in charge of applying electoral law. (b) Where there is no long-standing tradition of administrative authorities’ independence from those holding political power, independent, impartial electoral commissions must be set up at all levels, from the national level to polling station level. (c) The central electoral commission must be permanent in nature. (d) It should include: (i) at least one member of the judiciary; (ii) representatives of parties already in Parliament or having scored at least a given percentage of the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters. It may include: (iii) a representative of the Ministry of the Interior; (iv) representatives of national minorities. (e) Political parties must be equally represented on electoral commissions or must be able to observe the work of the impartial body. Equality may be construed strictly or on a proportional basis ... (f) The bodies appointing members of electoral commissions must not be free to dismiss them at will. (g) Members of electoral commissions must receive standard training. (h) It is desirable that electoral commissions take decisions by a qualified majority or by consensus.” 48. A selected passage from the Venice Commission’s Report on Electoral Law and Electoral Administration in Europe, issued on 9-10 June 2006, provides as follows: “34. Although in many countries the influence of the executive government on the composition of the electoral commissions has, in general, greatly been reduced, in a few States still a significant number of commission members are nominated and appointed by the executive government, e.g. the President of the Republic or the Ministry of the Interior or Justice. For example, in Georgia five (out of fifteen) members of the Central Electoral Commission are appointed by the President, not including those members appointed by the governing parties in Parliament. To avoid the risk of governmental interference in the commission’s work, as a rule the number of commission members nominated and appointed by the executive government should, if at all, be very low.”