24 THE GEORGIAN LABOUR PARTY v. GEORGIA JUDGMENT governmental model, and nine the mixed model. Among the thirteen Contracting States considered in the IDEA handbook, four are classified as following the independent model (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Moldova and Serbia), six the governmental model (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and three the mixed model (Hungary, Portugal and Spain). 62. There are no common standards among Contracting States as regards the composition of electoral commissions and the appointment of their members. As regards the authority which is competent for formally appointing the commission members, there are some countries which provide for a unique institution (the parliament in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Serbia; the Head of State in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom; and the government in Sweden). Even in these cases, however, other institutions and actors may intervene in the nomination process. For instance, in Bulgaria the members of the CEC are appointed after consultation with parliamentary parties and coalitions. In Hungary, the members of the National Election Committee are elected on the basis of a motion submitted by the Minister of the Interior, after taking the parties’ recommendations into account. In the United Kingdom, Her Majesty appoints the commission members on an address from the House of Commons, made after consultation with the leaders of registered parties. 63. There are other systems which provide for a mixed appointment by different State organs, including the judiciary. In Moldova, one member is appointed by the President, one by the government and seven by the Parliament. In Portugal, the National Election Commission is composed of a judge appointed by the judiciary, citizens designated by the Parliament and three specialists designated by governmental departments. The Spanish electoral boards have a quasi-judicial composition, since the majority of their members are directly appointed from among sitting judges by the General Council of the Judicial Power, whereas the rest are selected from among experts proposed by the political parties. 64. In systems which can be regarded as governmental from the standpoint of electoral management, such as Belgium or Germany, the majority of the assessors of the electoral boards/committees are appointed by the chairman (a judge in Belgium; the Federal Returning Officer nominated by the Ministry of the Interior in Germany) among electors. In Germany, most of the assessors are proposed by the political parties. In Italy, electoral boards responsible for the lawfulness of the electoral lists and candidates are created within the Court of Cassation and other tribunals. The difference with the countries mentioned above is that, in such countries, electoral bodies are set up for the exclusive purpose of specific elections. 65. In some States, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, the electoral commissions may be classified as expert-based. In others, such as Bulgaria, Moldova or Serbia1, the