Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
9
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
other condition of appointment. In fact, it did not even mention a pledge, which was set forth in a separate, unreferenced provision. See §29A.56.320. Thus, §29A.56.340 had
no connection to the appointment process and could be enforced independent of the existence of any pledge requirement. While the Court’s description of §29A.56.340 as a law
enforcing a condition of appointment may be helpful for the
Court’s claim that Washington’s law was rooted in Article
II, §1’s “power to appoint,” it is simply not accurate. Thus,
even accepting the Court’s strained reading of Article II,
§1’s text, I cannot agree with the Court’s effort to reconcile
Washington’s law with its desired theory.
In short, the Constitution does not speak to States’ power
to require Presidential electors to vote for the candidates
chosen by the people. The Court’s attempt to ground such
a power in Article II’s text falls short. Rather than contort
the language of both Article II and the state statute, I would
acknowledge that the Constitution simply says nothing
about the States’ power in this regard.
II
When the Constitution is silent, authority resides with
the States or the people. This allocation of power is both
embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly
required by the Tenth Amendment. The application of this
fundamental principle should guide our decision here.
A
“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the
consent of the people of each individual State.” U. S. Term
Limits, 514 U. S., at 846 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). When
the States ratified the Federal Constitution, the people of
each State acquiesced in the transfer of limited power to the
Federal Government. They ceded only those powers
granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution.
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