APDH v Côte d’Ivoire (2016) 1 AfCLR 668 693 independence and impartiality has also been made and clarified in a 20 manner similar to that of the European Court.20 20. In addition to the clear distinction between the conditions of independence and impartiality, the aforementioned judicial and arbitral practice has laid down precise standards for assessing the existence of such conditions. Since none of the legal instruments invoked by the Applicant in this case provides a definition or criteria for assessing the independence and impartiality of an independent electoral commission, the Court could have applied the said standards mutatis mutandis to determine the independence and impartiality of the Ivorian Electoral Commission. 21. The standards laid down by the European Court in its afore-cited judgment in the case of Findlay v the United Kingdom (supra, paragraph 18) suggest that the independence of a body is assessed in a purely objective manner, on the basis of the links between its 21 whereas impartiality has both members and external entities;21 22 The European Court had already, subjective and objective aspects.22 as far back as 1982, developed specific criteria for determining a court’s 23 impartiality.23 22. In the instant case, the Court’s assessment could be limited to that of independence of the Electoral Commission; which was a purely objective and relatively easy test, since it consisted in examining the composition of that body. It could then, if necessary, examine the question of impartiality of the Commission using, for example, the standards developed by its European counterpart. 23. In view of the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission, the Court could not but conclude that the Commission was not independent, and this conclusion would have enabled the Court to establish that the Commission did not present the appearance 20 Thus, according to an Arbitral Tribunal: “The concepts of independence and impartiality, although linked, are often regarded as distinct, even though the precise nature of the distinction is not always easy to grasp. Generally, independence is linked to the absence of relations with a party that could influence the decision of an arbitrator. Impartiality, for its part, concerns the absence of bias or predisposition towards one of the parties” (original text in English) Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. Argentina Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB / 03/19) and Suez, Sociedad General of Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17), and AWG Group Limited v The Argentine Republic (UNCITRAL), Decision on a Second Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, 12 May 2008, paragraph 28 21 “... to establish whether a court may be considered ‘independent’, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the mode of appointment and term of office of its members, the existence of protection against external pressure and whether or not there is an appearance of independence”, Application 22107/93, paragraph 73 of the judgment. 22 As for the “impartiality” condition, it has two aspects. First, the court must not subjectively manifest bias or personal prejudice. Secondly, the court must be objectively impartial, that is, offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect. 23 See, for example, the case of Piersack v Belgium, Application No. 8692/79, Judgment of 1 October 1982, paragraph 30; and the case of Hauschildt v Denmark, Application No 10486/83, Judgment of 24 May 1989, paragraphs 46-48.