TLS and Others v Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34 61 a result, “it is extraneous to this case’’ (Paragraphs 19-20 of the Brief in Response; see also the Public Hearing of 14 June 2012, Oral Hearing Verbatim Record, p. 26, lines 19-20). In its Rejoinder, the 2nd Applicant noted that “Article 3(I) of the Protocol (...) does not specify which instrument should be considered as a human rights instrument’” and argues further “that any Treaty containing provisions on the protection of human rights should be considered as relevant and within the jurisdiction of the Court” (Paragraph 13). At the Public Hearing of 15 June 2012, the second Applicant indicated that “the East African Treaty (...) does have in Article 6 a provision that protects the human rights’’ and “that provision not the entire treaty but that particular provision (...) is part of applicable law before the Court’’ (Public Hearing of 15 June 2012, Oral Hearing Verbatim Record, p. 12, lines 20-23). 13. Therefore, contrary to what it indicated in Paragraph 87 of the Judgment, the Court had also to determine whether the Treaty establishing the East African Community was applicable in the light of Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol, as well as Rule 26(I) (a) of the Rules of Court. 14. These three provisions make mention of “any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned” and direct reference to three requirements: 1) The instrument in question must be an international treaty, hence the requirement that it be ratified by the State concerned, 2) this international treaty must “relate to human rights” and 3) it must have been ratified by the State concerned. These three requirements are cumulative and, if met, the Court would again have had to ensure that the said treaty is “relevant” to the treatment of the matter. 15. On the issue of whether a particular treaty can be considered as “a human rights instrument”, the Court could, for instance, have suggested that some distinction be made between treaties which deal mainly with the protection of human rights and those which address other issues but which contain provisions related to human rights. Treaties of the first category which are crafted in such a manner as to give “subjective rights” to individuals could beyond any doubt be considered as human rights instruments; they are human rights instruments par excellence. Treaties of the first category providing essentially for undertakings by States Parties and no subjective rights to individuals could also be considered as human rights instruments. For treaties of the second category, that is treaties the main purpose of which is not the protection of human rights but which contain provisions relating to human rights, their case is more problematic insofar as the said provisions generally do not grant subjective rights to individuals within the jurisdiction of States Parties. The Court possessing «la compétence de sa compétence» (Article 3(2) of the Protocol), it is for it to determine which are the treaties relating to human rights falling within its material jurisdiction, taking due consideration of their “relevance” for the examination of a case (Article 3(I) of the Protocol).