TLS and Others v Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34 63 by clearly indicating that in the instant case its personal jurisdiction is solely based on the Protocol and the optional declaration. 21. On the basis of the non-retroactivity of treaties, a well-established principle in international law, the Court cannot be seized of allegations of violations of human and people’s rights by an individual or by a nongovernmental organization unless such alleged violations occurred after the entry into force for the State concerned, not only of the African Charter but also of the Protocol and more important of the optional declaration; Article 34(6) of the Protocol does not suffer any ambiguity in this regard since it provides that “the Court shall not receive any petition under Article 5(3) involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration”. 22. In the instant case, the critical date for determining the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the Applications cannot therefore be the date of entry into force for Tanzania of the sole African Charter or the Protocol; the only date to be considered is that of the deposit by Tanzania of the declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, that is 29 March 2010. It is therefore clear, on this basis, that any alleged violation of the African Charter by Tanzania occurring before that date would not fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court unless in circumstances where such violation bears a continuous character. 23. In Paragraph 84 of the Judgment, the Court should have clearly indicated that the only date to be considered in the instant case is the date of entry into force of the optional declaration for the Respondent State and not the date of entry into force of the Charter or the Protocol for the said State; it should then have focused its attention on the sole issue of the continuous character of the alleged violations beyond the critical date of 29 March 2010. II. Admissibility of the Applications 24. The Court should have considered, even in a summary manner, the issue of the legal interest to act of the Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal Human Rights Center, the two non-governmental organizations which lodged the first Applications. 25. Indeed, a distinction needs to be made between the “capacity to act” and ‘”the interest to act” before the Court. The capacity of an entity to act relates to its authority to appear before the Court and therefore comes within the personal jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the Applicant. The interest to act, for its part, refers to the notion of legitimate interest, in other words the legally recognized or protected interest, the existence of which the Court has to independently determine in each case. In other words the capacity to act deals with the Applicant whereas the interest to act relates to the action that he or she undertakes. 26. An action before the Court is indeed only allowed if the Applicant justifies his or her own interest in initiating it. To show proof of such interest, the Applicant must accordingly demonstrate that the action or abstention of the Respondent State applies to a right which the Applicant has or the right of an individual on behalf of which it wishes to seize the Court.