66 AFRICAN COURT LAW REPORT VOLUME 1 (2006-2016) After having established that there actually exists a violation of these two rights and that various groups of peoples were given a different treatment, the Court should have underlined that any difference of treatment does not necessarily constitute a discrimination. Indeed, as the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations indicated in its General Comment of Article 26 of the Second International Covenant, “differentiation is not discrimination if it is based on objective and reasonable criteria and if the aim is legitimate in light of the Covenant”11 (see a similar statement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Lithgow v United Kingdom).22 38. It is only after having laid down these premises, that the Court should have dealt, as it did in paragraph 119 of the Judgment, with the objective and reasonable nature of the limitations introduced by the Tanzanian constitutional amendments, and ruled that the aim of the difference of treatment is not legitimate in light of the Charter. *** Separate opinion: NGOEPE 1. I agree with the majority judgment, of which I am part, in all respects. lt is a judgment which, to any seriously diligent reader, whether they agree with it or not, has been written with sufficient clarity and lucidity of thought. I have, however, felt the need to write a separate opinion on a conundrum which has been vexing this Court for some time and which has manifested itself in this judgment differently from the way it has done in the past. lt is this: in writing a judgment, should this Court always, in every matter, deal with admissibility first and only thereafter with jurisdiction, or vice-versa? Unlike in previous judgments, this judgment has this time round elected to first deal with the issue of admissibility, and then jurisdiction. 2. There has never been, in any matter, a unanimous decision that the Court must every time start with jurisdiction, or with admissibility. Views have on every single occasion differed on this aspect, with strong arguments advanced in support of each view. I have likened this debate to the infamous age-old one: the chicken or the egg first? Personally I do not, at this stage, subscribe to any one of the two approaches as I do not see the need for rigidity. My problem is therefore not as to which one should be dealt with first, but with a rigid approach that one must always start with the one and never with the other. 1 2 General Comment No. 8, Non-Discrimination, adopted by the Committee on 10 November 1989 during its 37th Session, Paragraph 13; see also, for example, its Views adopted on 15 July 2002 and relating to Communication No. 932/2000, Human Rights Committee, Doc. CCPJUC/75!J)/932/2000. 26 July 2002, pp. 21-24, paras 12.2-13. 18. According to the European Court, for the purpose of Article 14 of the European Convention, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective or reasonable justification”, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim”, Application No 9063180, Judgment of 8 July 19R6, Series A, No. 102, paras 177, European Human Rights Report, 1986. No. 8, p. 329.