70 AFRICAN COURT LAW REPORT VOLUME 1 (2006-2016) alleged continuing violation is invoked). That clarification is all the more necessary as, in regard to the Application of the principle of the nonretroactivity of treaties, the 2nd Applicant seems to be making a distinction between treaties of a normative nature and those of an institutional nature (supra, paragraph 9). 13. Such distinction however - which seems to suggest that only the date of entry into force of treaties guaranteeing substantial rights is relevant (as opposed to treaties setting up monitoring institutions) -, is not grounded anywhere in international law. Indeed, to take the instant case as an example, even though the Protocol establishes an institutional mechanism for the protection of substantial rights guaranteed under the Charter, it still remains “a treaty” within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. Article 2.1(a) of this Convention provides that “‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation” (italics added). As can be seen, on the one hand, any international agreement in written form between States can be considered as a treaty regardless of whether they set substantive norms or establish institutional mechanisms; on the other, its name is of no consequence. 14. Given that the Protocol establishing the Court is a treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, all provisions of the convention are therefore applicable to it. The relevant provision applicable to the issue under consideration is Article 28 which deals with the principle of nonretroactivity of treaties as follows: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party”. To circumvent the Application of the principle of non-retroactivity of the treaties in the instant case, the 2nd Applicant relies neither on a different intention of the parties arising from the Protocol itself, nor on a different intention otherwise established. 15. In fact, to determine the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Court, in a matter such as this one, there must be cumulative consideration of the dates of entry into force in regard to the Respondent State, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol establishing the Court and the optional declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court to receive Applications from individuals and non-governmental organizations as provided for in Article 34(6) of the Protocol. If the alleged violation had occurred prior to any of these crucial dates, the principle of non-retroactivity would have applied in full force, regardless of whether the alleged violation took place after the other dates. 16. In the instant case, and in relation to the issue under consideration, the need to take into account the date of entry into force of the Protocol with regard to the Respondent State is all the more crucial as it is indeed the Protocol that specifically conferred the contentious