sition. Although the President merely suggested an unconstitutional national referendum for confidence vote and did not yet actually institute such referendum, the suggestion toward the public of a confidence vote by way of national referendum, which is not permitted under the Constitution, is itself in violation of Article 72 of the Constitution and not in conformity with the President's obligation to realize and protect the Constitution. (4) Act of disregarding the opinion of the National Assembly Pursuant to the acknowledged facts, the President disregarded the conclusion of the National Assembly appointment hearing held on April 25, 2003 that Ko Young-gu was inappropriate for the position as the Director of National Intelligence Service, and did not accept immediately the resolution of removal by the National Assembly of September 3, 2003 to dismiss the Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs. (A) The President possesses the authority to appoint and remove the members of the executive branch of the government under his or her direction and supervision (Article 78 of the Constitution). Therefore, the appointment of the head of the Director of National Intelligence Service is part of the President's exclusive authority and the President does not bear any obligation to accept the opinion concluded at the appointment hearing at the National Assembly. Thus, the President did not violate the Constitution by impeding upon the authority of the National Assembly or infringing upon the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, in disregarding the decision of the National Assembly's appointment hearing. (B) Notwithstanding the authority of the National Assembly to recommend removal of the Prime Minister or other ministers of the administration (Article 63 of the Constitution), such recommendation is a mere suggestion to remove such public official from office with no legally binding effect, and not the authority to determine the removal binding the President thereto. The meaning of the 'authority to recommend removal from office' is that the President may be subject to an indirect check and control by holding politically responsible the Prime Minister or other ministers of the administration serving the President's administration, instead of the President who may not be held politically responsible during the presidential term. An interpretation understanding the authority to recommend removal of certain public officials of Article 63 of the Constitution as the authority to determine removal of such public officials does not conform to the constitutional provision itself, nor can such interpretation be harmonized with the current constitutional separation of powers order that does - 189 -