The plaintiff’s arguments Introduction 49 As with the defendant’s arguments, the plaintiff’s arguments could also be classified under the two broad headings referred to above. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the parties needed to join issue and, in particular, in view of the fact that the plaintiff had also to respond to the arguments made by the defendant. Precedent 50 Contrary to the approach adopted by Mr Chan, Mr Ravi argued that this court was not bound by the Malaysian decisions. This approach was probably due to the fact, as I have already mentioned, that the weight of Malaysian authority supported the defendant. Nevertheless, Mr Ravi did draw my attention to one Malaysian High Court decision which supported the plaintiff. This is the decision of Sulaiman v Choong Yoon Chong [1957] MLJ 170 (“the Sulaiman case”). In that case, the plaintiff deposited security within the time specified but made the deposit with the wrong officer. The defendant argued that the rules on security had not been complied with and therefore applied for the election petition to be dismissed. According to Smith J (at 171): Regulation 12(3) [the equivalent of r 13(4) of our PER] does not say that a petition shall automatically be dismissed if deposit is not made. It enjoins that no further proceedings shall be had on the petition and that the respondent may apply for the petition to be dismissed. The action which the Judge takes is entirely discretionary. In this case I am satisfied that sufficient security has been given and that there has been such sufficient compliance with the spirit of the Regulations that it would be inequitable to refuse the petitioner a hearing of his petition. This application is therefore refused. 51 Mr Ravi also referred to wider arguments, albeit still in the Malaysian context. In particular, he argued that Malaysia possessed alternative avenues by which persons aggrieved in the context of elections could have recourse to. I did not verify the various avenues referred to by Mr Ravi. I am prepared to assume that he is correct and hence take his case in this particular regard at its highest. It followed, so his argument continued, that the Malaysian courts could afford to adopt a stricter approach towards contravention of the equivalent of our PER because aggrieved persons had the alternative avenues just referred to. Although I have refrained thus far from expressing my views on the arguments tendered before me as I will be dealing with them holistically below, I make an exception in the present instance as it seems to me that counsel’s argument is, with the greatest respect, neutral at best and misconceived at worst. 52 In the first instance, the focus must always be on the statutory language concerned (here, that to be found in r 13). Surrounding material is useful only in so far as it assists in throwing light on the provision in its specific context. To this end, the wider arguments and considerations raised by Mr Ravi lie beyond the specific context I have just referred to and are therefore irrelevant to the interpretation of the language and intention of r 13 itself. More to the point, the integrity of the legal process ought not to be compromised in such an important context as this. 53 Secondly, the wider arguments and considerations raised by Mr Ravi might actually entail a conclusion contrary to what he has advocated. If, for example, alternative avenues in fact exist (in the Malaysian context) to vindicate the rights of an aggrieved person in the context of elections, why should the courts not adopt a less strict approach? While by no means conclusive, this is an at least plausible argument that militates directly against the argument proffered on behalf of the plaintiff by