as the defendants to s 90 applications are usually the successful candidates whose seats are being impugned. However, even assuming that the plaintiff was entitled to file her application in the present proceedings against the Attorney-General, it was nevertheless undeniable that the rights of all the elected Members of Parliament in the 2006 General Election (as de facto defendants) were necessarily involved as a result of the plaintiff’s application. This actually underscores the point I have just made with respect to viewing the relevant Act and rules from the perspective of the rights of the defendant (whether de facto or de jure)as well. In other words, the strict timelines (inter alia, in r 13(1)) represented, in my view, the Legislature’s attempt to balance the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s rights which were, ex hypothesi, in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Whilst the Legislature afforded the plaintiff the right to impugn election proceedings which, if successful, would take away the defendant’s rights (including the rights of “de facto defendants” in proceedings such as the present), because of precisely the nature of the proceedings as I have just put it, the Legislature imposed strict timelines to ensure that the plaintiff’s application was mounted seriously and in good faith. Indeed, in the specific context of r 13 itself, we have seen (at [30] above) that the purposes for requiring the furnishing of security are not only consistent with but also buttress the point made in the preceding sentence. It is undoubtedly the case that the public interest ought to be safeguarded as well. I do not wish to detract, in any way, from this particular (and extremely important) purpose and rationale – not least because it has been embodied in authorities as august as that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (in the Devan Nair case at [35] above). However, I do need to emphasise that there is an additional reason which is by no means insignificant and which also contributes to the reason and rationale for the strict timelines embodied within, inter alia, r 13(1): This is to ensure that the defendant candidate’s rights are not disregarded as the plaintiff asserts his or her rights under the Act and the PER in the process. In this regard, the following observations by Singham J in the Dr Shafie case ([20] supra at [31]) might also be usefully noted: I am of the view that where it is viewed contemporaneously in the context of the other provisions of the Act … r 4 of the Election Petition Rules 1954 confirms not only the intention of the legislature to expedite the early determination of election petition but also to prevent any injustice on the defending candidates, whose election is being challenged, against unspecific and unforeseen allegations from irresponsible challengers. [emphasis added] 76 Returning once again to the language of r 13(1) (and another point), one cannot help but notice that the requirement for the furnishing of security on behalf of the plaintiff is couched in ostensibly mandatory language. I refer, in particular, to the phrase “ shall be given” [emphasis added]. However, in doing so, I must not be taken to be adopting a pedantic approach, much less a dogmatic one, to the effect that whenever words such as “shall” are used, the provision concerned must necessarily be mandatory. Everything depends on the specific language of, as well as the context surrounding, the provision itself. However, other things being equal, such words do suggest that the provision concerned is mandatory. I have, in fact, already canvassed not only the other parts of r 13(1) itself but also the surrounding context as well as the aims of the Act and the PER themselves, and shall therefore not repeat my analysis above. In the circumstances, it is clear to me that the word “shall” in r 13(1) means that this provision is itself mandatory. 77 I turn now to the language of r 13(4) which is, of course, the provision under which the present proceedings have been brought by the defendant; it reads as follows: If security required by this rule to be provided is not given by the plaintiff, no further proceedings shall be had on the application under section 90, and the defendant may apply by summons to the Judge for an order directing the dismissal of the application under section 90 and for the payment of the defendant’s costs. [emphasis added]