by this rule shall be given by a deposit of money. [emphasis added] 87 It will be seen that in almost six decades, there has not been an enormous change in the amount of security required. Indeed, the present amounts (in the present r 13(2) of the PER) were introduced only in 1982 via the Parliamentary Elections Petition (Amendment) Rules 1982 (S 313/1982). More significantly, perhaps, the amounts stipulated in r 12(2) of the Third Schedule of the 1947 Ordinance were extremely sizable when judged against the relative exchange rates and value of money at that particular point in time. Whilst not conclusive, this is an indication that, as originally conceived, the requirement with respect to security for costs was a seriously intended one. This, in turn, supports my finding that r 13 of the PER was intended to be mandatory in nature. 88 I note, also, that the other Malaysian decisions cited by Mr Chan also buttress my more specific finding with regard to r 13. Let me elaborate. 89 These other decisions related not so much to r 13 but, rather, to the Malaysian equivalent of r 16 of our PER (see, for example, the Devan Nair case). We have already noted that it has been clearly established in the case law (including the case just cited) that this particular rule is mandatory in nature. 90 My analysis thus far demonstrates – unequivocally, in my view – that decisions such as the Chong Thain Vun case do not contain mere assertions without more but are more than amply justified by an analysis of the language as well as the context and rationale of r 13. At this juncture, we note, once again, the overlap between this broad category (entitled “Precedent”) and the next (entitled “General principle”). 91 I also agree with Mr Chan that the conclusion I have arrived at in the preceding paragraph is further buttressed, on a more general level, by the broader considerations set out by Lord Upjohn in the Devan Nair case (at [35] above) – in particular, the first, which centres on the need for a speedy determination of the controversy. Mr Ravi sought to meet this particular point by an argument that was more in the sphere of general principle (see [55] above). To recapitulate, Mr Ravi argued that there would, in any event, be a speedy determination of the plaintiff’s application inasmuch as the plaintiff’s application had already been fixed for hearing on 27 June 2006. With respect, however, I find this particular argument (whilst seemingly attractive at first blush) to be flawed for the following reasons. 92 Firstly, if not for the present summons taken out by the defendant under r 13(4), the plaintiff would have continued with her application without complying with r 13 of the PER. This issue might have then been raised as a preliminary jurisdictional point at the hearing on 27 June 2006 itself. This might then have resulted in an adjournment of the substantive hearing. I do not want to speculate but it would have been very surprising if a delay had not resulted along the lines I have just stated. 93 Secondly, and more importantly, I find Mr Ravi’s argument rather disingenuous. There was no guarantee that the substantive hearing would be fixed as early as it has. The fact that we now know that the hearing has been fixed early does not necessarily mean that it would have been the case in the first instance. Hindsight, as the saying goes, is 20/20 vision. In any event, and even more importantly, the entire point of the matter is that the strict timelines contained in the PER (including that embodied in r 13) were to ensure that no further time whatsoever beyond what was stipulated in the rules themselves was wasted. In other words, a speedy determination of the controversy is not a “wait-and-see” situation, such as the plaintiff would have us believe. It is a direct process, if you like, without the slightest delay contemplated. Besides, if one were to accept Mr Ravi’s argument, there is virtually no hearing that would not satisfy the rationale centring on a speedy