SACHS J form of statutes or regulations. . . [T]he extent and content of a prisoner's rights are to be determined by reference not only to the relevant legislation but also by reference 21 to his inviolable common-law rights.” [19] These words were written before South Africa became a constitutional democracy. Now the common law rights have been reinforced and entrenched by the Constitution.22 It is in this context that the powers and responsibilities of the Commission under the 1998 Electoral Act and the Commission Act must be interpreted, and the question should be answered as to whether prisoners' constitutional rights to vote will be infringed if no appropriate arrangements are made to enable them to register and vote. [20] As has been stated above, the right of every adult citizen to vote in elections for every legislative body is given in unqualified terms. The first and second respondents correctly conceded that prisoners retain the right to vote, since Parliament has not passed any law limiting that right. It is not necessary in the present case to determine whether or not Parliament could have disqualified all or any prisoners. The fact is that it has not sought to do so. The basic argument of the respondents, therefore, was that although the right of prisoners to vote remained intact, prisoners had lost the opportunity to exercise that right through their own misconduct. This argument was accepted by Els J. At the heart of his judgment is a statement that prisoners are the authors of their own misfortune and therefore cannot require special arrangements to 21 At 141 C - D. 22 This was affirmed by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391; 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at paras 142 - 3. 25