[46] Courts and tribunals have held that discrimination may, but need not, be intentional. 6 One must look also at the adverse impact or effect of facially neutral practices and policies on an individual or group of individuals, related to prohibited grounds of discrimination. [47] The case law recognizes the difficulty of proving allegations of discrimination by direct evidence. Discrimination is frequently practised in a very subtle and subterranean manner. Overt discrimination is rare: Basi v. Canadian National Railway Company (No. 1) (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/5029 (C.H.R.T.), at para. 5038. Rather, it is the Tribunal's task to consider all of the circumstances to determine if there is what is described in the Basi case as the "subtle scent of discrimination". [48] The standard of proof in discrimination cases is the ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities. According to this standard, discrimination may be inferred where the evidence offered in support of the discrimination renders such an inference more probable than the other possible inferences or hypotheses: Premakumar v. Air Canada (No. 2) (2002), 42 C.H.R.R. D/63 (C.H.R.T.), at para. 81. XIII. LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO REMEDY [49] The general remedial part of the CHRA is found in section 53. Subsections 53(1)-(4) outline the discretionary awards and orders that the Tribunal may make against a respondent following its substantiation of the complaint before it. Included are orders to cease a discriminatory practice; compensatory awards up to $20,000 for any pain and suffering experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice; a $20,000 maximum of "special compensation" for loss arising from the wilful or reckless discriminatory action of the respondent; expenses incurred as a result of the loss from the discriminatory action, except for legal costs or expenses in the Tribunal proceeding. 7 The Tribunal also may order the taking of measures to redress the discriminatory practice, or to prevent the same or similar practice from occurring in the future. [50] The Supreme Court of Canada has allowed human rights tribunals a certain degree of latitude in the making of remedial orders. 8 This is in keeping with the purposes and goals of anti-discrimination statutes. Of course, orders of a remedial nature must be linked or have a nexus9 to the lis or subject-matter of the complaint substantiated by the tribunal: the "four corners of the complaint" or "the real subject matter". 10 The remedy must be commensurate with the breach. The orders also must be reasonable 11 and the remedial discretion exercised in light of the evidence presented. 12 2010 CHRT 4 (CanLII) [45] The initial onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the CHRA rests with a complainant or the Commission. A prima facie case is one which covers the allegations made and, if believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant's favour, in the absence of an answer or justification from the respondent: Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Limited, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 28. Once that is established, the burden then shifts to the respondent to establish a justification or explanation for the discriminatory practice or action. The respondent's explanation should not figure in the determination of whether the complainant has made out a prima facie case of discrimination: Lincoln v. Bay Ferries Ltd., 2004 FCA 204, at para. 22.