40 YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION In concrete terms, Turkish political parties have developed electoral techniques to “by-pass” the obstacles; these include in particular putting up independent candidates supported by a party (but who immediately rejoin their original party once elected) and adding candidates from one party to the list of another party. The Court had no hesitation in finding that this was only a makeshift solution (see paragraph 138 of the judgment). It also drew attention to all the difficulties in such a system, inasmuch as these candidates are subject to a number of unfavourable restrictions and conditions compared with political parties (see, for instance, paragraph 35 of the judgment). The Court nevertheless accepted these “stratagems” on account of what was presented as their result in practice. In other words, the end justified the means. Apart from the obvious problem of political morality that such a position raises, it seems to us to be logically difficult to accept, since the Court itself acknowledges that these “stratagems” run counter to the legitimate aim of fixing such a high threshold, namely preventing parliamentary fragmentation. Furthermore, these correctives and safeguards are exclusively the result of political considerations and agreements and there can be no certainty that they will remain available in the future. These practices, which are in any case themselves contrary to the Turkish Constitution and Turkish electoral legislation (section 16 of Law no. 2839 on the election of members of the National Assembly), may be changed and disappear from one day to the next. That being the case, it is difficult to accept that such correctives may be described as safeguards for the purposes of the Convention. Lastly, the Court did not consider the detrimental effect of these techniques on the party system as such when parties have to seek and find protection from other parties for the purpose of slipping through the 10% threshold. In themselves, parties represent and unite different currents of thought. Any interference with their independent participation in elections curtails the free expression of the opinion of the people – whether the interference is direct or indirect. Certainly, this is the case when different parties form hidden alliances during the elections, by-passing the legislation in place as interpreted by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 42 of the judgment). To achieve such alliances, candidates from one party have to be accepted, even approved of, by another party, which undermines the independence of parties especially in respect of their representatives standing as candidates on other parties’ lists. In other words, it means playing “hide and seek” with voters, thus undermining essential democratic principles. 5. The voting system in the instant case, which has the highest threshold in Europe, which fails to accommodate the interests and opinions of a large part of the electorate that identifies strongly with a particular region, or with a national or other minority (see paragraphs 114-15 of the judgment), and in which forming open coalitions with other political parties is prohibited (see