10 COOPER v. HARRIS Opinion of the Court more likely to be plainly wrong if some judges disagree with it. Cf. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 17) (noting that we are even less likely to disturb a factual determination when “multiple trial courts have reached the same finding”). But the very premise of clear error review is that there are often “two permissible”— because two “plausible”—“views of the evidence.” Ander­ son, 470 U. S., at 574; see supra, at 4. Even assuming the state court’s findings capture one such view, the District Court’s assessment may yet represent another. And the permissibility of the District Court’s account is the only question before us. III With that out of the way, we turn to the merits of this case, beginning (appropriately enough) with District 1. As noted above, the court below found that race furnished the predominant rationale for that district’s redesign. See supra, at 6–7. And it held that the State’s interest in complying with the VRA could not justify that consideration of race. See supra, at 7. We uphold both conclusions. A Uncontested evidence in the record shows that the State’s mapmakers, in considering District 1, purposefully established a racial target: African-Americans should make up no less than a majority of the voting-age population. See 159 F. Supp. 3d, at 611–614. Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis were not coy in expressing that goal. They repeatedly told their colleagues that District 1 had to be majority-minority, so as to comply with the VRA. During a Senate debate, for example, Rucho explained that District 1 “must include a sufficient number of African-Americans” to make it “a majority black district.” App. 689–690. Similarly, Lewis informed the House and Senate redistricting committees that the district must