Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 17 Opinion of the Court group to elect its favored candidates. See 1 Tr. 21–22 (counsel’s explanation that “the [S]tate interpreted” Strickland to say that, in order to protect AfricanAmericans’ electoral strength and thus avoid §2 liability, the BVAP in District 1 “need[ed] to be above 50 percent”). That idea, though, is at war with our §2 jurisprudence— Strickland included. Under the State’s view, the third Gingles condition is no condition at all, because even in the absence of effective white bloc-voting, a §2 claim could succeed in a district (like the old District 1) with an under50% BVAP. But this Court has made clear that unless each of the three Gingles prerequisites is established, “there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.” Growe, 507 U. S., at 41. And Strickland, far from supporting North Carolina’s view, underscored the necessity of demonstrating effective white bloc-voting to prevail in a §2 vote-dilution suit. The plurality explained that “[i]n areas with substantial crossover voting,” §2 plaintiffs would not “be able to establish the third Gingles precondition” and so “majority-minority districts would not be required.” 556 U. S., at 24; see also ibid. (noting that States can “defend against alleged §2 violations by pointing to crossover voting patterns and to effective crossover districts”). Thus, North Carolina’s belief that it was compelled to redraw District 1 (a successful crossover district) as a majority-minority district rested not on a “strong basis in evidence,” but instead on a pure error of law. Alabama, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22). In sum: Although States enjoy leeway to take race-based actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA, that latitude cannot rescue District 1. We by no means “insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, determine precisely what percent minority population [§2 of the VRA] demands.” Ibid. But neither will we approve a racial gerrymander whose necessity is supported by no evidence and whose raison d’être is a legal