Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 28 of 153 (the “ballot-building software”) on public-facing internet-connected desktop computers of the individual ballot builders, then copied over from the publicfacing computer onto a “lockable” USB drive, which is then inserted into the private27 computer to be uploaded into the secure GEMS server for storage of the ballot programming files. (Id. at 77-78, 166-67.) Mr. Barnes scans and reformats the lockable USB drive during each transfer. (Id. at 77-78, 101, 107.) He follows the same process when copying files from the private GEMS server to the USB drive and back onto the public internet-facing computer for distribution to the counties. (Id. at 101, 107.) The Secretary of State has contracted with ES&S for ballot building support services to “assist” the Center for Election Systems in constructing the GEMS databases that are used within county elections. (Id. at 83-84.) Three individuals from ES&S28 work solely on Georgia election databases and perform “their ballot building work within their own purviews” and construct the GEMS databases on desktop computers from their homes. (Id. at 84-85.) According to Barnes, the individuals are subject to the same requirements for using air gapped equipment as the Secretary of State, though he testified he does not know what physical security parameters each of the individuals have within their homes. (Id. at 85- Mr. Barnes often refers to the private computer housing the GEMS server as “air gapped.” However, as Dr. Halderman and Dr. Shamos both testified – the actual process used by the Secretary of State’s Office does not constitute an “air gapped” system as explained below. The Court will therefore refer to “private” as not being directly connected to the internet. 28 Two of these individuals previously worked for Barnes at CES and the third worked for Cobb County. (Tr. Vol. 1, Doc. 570 at 85.) Barnes was not aware of whether these individuals were employees of ES&S or independent contractors. 27 28