Previous 36 / 54 Next

464 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMM. Opinion of the Court convincing evidence to the contrary," that the Party's independent expenditures formed a link in a chain of corruptionby-conduit. 518 U. S., at 617. "The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate," Buckley, supra, at 47; therefore, "the constitutionally significant fact" in Colorado I was "the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure," 518 U. S., at 617. Here, however, just the opposite is true. There is no significant functional difference between a party's coordinated expenditure and a direct party contribution to the candidate, and there is good reason to expect that a party's right of unlimited coordinated spending would attract increased contributions to parties to finance exactly that kind of spending.28 Coordinated expenditures of money donated to a party are tailor-made to undermine contribution limits. Therefore the choice here is not, as in Buckley and Colorado I, between a limit on pure contributions and pure expenditures. 29 The choice is between limiting contributions and ' The dissent notes a superficial tension between this analysis and our recent statement in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001), that "it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding [entity] can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party," id., at 529-530. Unlike Bartnicki, there is no clear dichotomy here between law abider and lawbreaker. The problem of circumvention is a systemic one, accomplished only through complicity between donor and party. 2 Also, again, contrast Bartnicki, where the gulf between the First Amendment implications of two enforcement options was clear. We rejected the decision to penalize disclosure of lawfully obtained information of public interest instead of vigorously enforcing prohibitions on intercepting private conversations. Ibid.

Select target paragraph3

● ● ●

Federal Election Committee v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on a political party's coordinated expenditures — spending made by a party in cooperation, consultation, or concert with a candidate — are constitutional under the First Amendment as a means of preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits. Specifically, whether a party's coordinated expenditures, which function like contributions to the candidate, may be restricted to prevent donors from funneling large contributions through a party to a candidate.

Alleged Acts: On remand from Colorado I (1996), the case returned to the lower courts to address the question the Supreme Court had left open: whether FECA's Party Expenditure Provision could constitutionally limit in-fact coordinated expenditures — i.e., party spending that was actually coordinated with a candidate's campaign. The FEC sought to uphold the limits as a means of preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits: without limits on party coordinated expenditures, a donor could give large contributions to a political party, which the party could then spend in coordination with a candidate, effectively bypassing the limits on direct contributions to that candidate.

Procedural history: The district court granted summary judgment to the Colorado Party, holding the Party Expenditure Provision unconstitutional because the FEC "failed to offer relevant, admissible evidence which suggests that coordinated party expenditures must be limited to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof." The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FEC had not demonstrated that coordinated spending by political parties corrupts, or creates the appearance of corrupting, the electoral process, and that the limits constituted an "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment freedoms. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FEC had not demonstrated that coordinated spending by political parties corrupts, or creates the appearance of corrupting, the electoral process, and that the limits constituted an "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment freedoms.

Summary: Colorado II (2001) held that a political party's coordinated expenditures — spending made in cooperation with a candidate — may be constitutionally limited to prevent circumvention of the base contribution limits. The Court applied a deferential standard of review and reasoned that coordinated expenditures are functionally equivalent to direct contributions. This decision was later overruled by the Supreme Court in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), which held that FECA's political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment because the combination of base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements sufficiently serves the anti-circumvention interest without the need for the additional speech-restrictive limits. The Court in NRSC v. FEC adopted the reasoning of Justice Thomas's Colorado II dissent, which had argued that earmarking rules were a more "precise response" to circumvention concerns and that the limits broadly restricted political party speech.

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures. The Court held that a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike truly independent expenditures, may be constitutionally restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. The Court reasoned that coordinated expenditures are "virtually indistinguishable" from direct contributions to a candidate, because when a party coordinates its spending with a candidate, the expenditure is "as useful to the candidate as cash." The Court held that the government's interest in preventing circumvention of the base contribution limits was a sufficient justification for the coordinated-expenditure limits. Without such limits, donors could give large contributions to a party that would then be spent in coordination with a candidate, effectively bypassing the contribution limits. The Court noted that "parties' capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity that apparently opens them to exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution and coordinated spending limits binding on other political players."

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 25, 2001

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep533/usrep533431/usrep533431.pdf

Primary Documents

Federal Election Committee v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee.pdf
English
Download View

Election Judgments - IFES

Select target paragraph3

Federal Election Committee v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee

Primary Documents

Notifications