466 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMM. THOMAS, J., dissenting Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966), and it is the lifeblood of a self-governing people, see Shrink Missouri, supra, at 405 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("[P]olitical speech in the course of elections [is] the speech upon which democracy depends"). I remain baffled that this Court has extended the most generous First Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits, wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting drive-in movies with nudity,' but has offered only tepid protection to the core speech and associational rights that our Founders sought to defend. In this case, the Government does not attempt to argue that the Party Expenditure Provision satisfies strict scrutiny, see Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983) (providing that, under strict scrutiny, a restriction on speech is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest). Nor could it. For the reasons explained in my separate opinions in Colorado I, supra, at 641-644, and Shrink Missouri, supra, at 427-430, the campaign financing law at issue fails strict scrutiny. II We need not, however, overrule Buckley and apply strict scrutiny in order to hold the Party Expenditure Provision unconstitutional. Even under Buckley, which described the requisite scrutiny as "exacting" and "rigorous," 424 U. S., at 16, 29, the regulation cannot pass constitutional muster. In practice, Buckley scrutiny has meant that restrictions on contributions by individuals and political committees do not violate the First Amendment so long as they are "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important" government interest, Shrink Missouri,supra,at 387-389; see also Buckley, supra, at 58, but that restrictions on independent expendi'NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 444 (1963); Cohen v. California,403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 208-215 (1975).